No Hatred or Malice, Fear or Affection": Media and Sentencing by Ouss, Aurélie & Philippe, Arnaud
		 1	
“No Hatred or Malice, Fear or Affection”: Media and Sentencing 
 
 
 
Arnaud Philippe 
(corresponding author) 
Post-Doctoral Fellow 
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse 
Toulouse School of Economics 
21 allée de Brienne 
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6 
arnaud.philippe@iast.fr 
 
Aurélie Ouss 
Post-Doctoral Fellow 
University of Chicago Crime Lab 
33 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1600 
Chicago, IL 60602 
aouss@uchicago.edu 
 
 
		 2	
“No Hatred or Malice, Fear or Affection”: Media and Sentencing 
 
Arnaud Philippe and Aurélie Ouss1 
 
May 2017 
 
Abstract: We explore how television broadcasting of unrelated criminal justice events 
affects sentencing. Exploiting as-good-as-random variation in news content before a 
verdict, we find that sentences are 3 months longer when the verdict is reached after 
coverage of crime. Sentence increase with media exposure to crime, not crime itself, 
and the effect tapers off quickly. Our results suggest that professional experience and 
expertise mitigates the effect of irrelevant external information. This paper highlights 
the influence of noise in the news cycle: media can temporarily influence decisions by 
changing what is top-of-the-mind, rather than signaling deeper changes in offending 
or societal concerns. 
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“You swear and promise not listen to hatred or malice or fear or affection […] and to 
decide according to your conscience and intimate conviction, with the impartiality 
and firmness that befits an honest and free person.” 
  
– French juror pledge 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The right to a fair trial, one of the cornerstones of the criminal justice system, implies 
that defendants should be tried based only on the facts at hand and not on extraneous 
factors. However, a growing literature shows that decisions of both citizens (mock 
juries) and judges are vulnerable to extraneous influences such as physiological 
fatigue.2 We show that in an important field setting – criminal courts – actual jurors 
respond to irrelevant information. Specifically, we show that sentence length varies 
with media coverage of unrelated crimes. 
Our study exploits as-good-as-random variation in television news content at time of 
trial to estimate the causal effects of media on sentencing decisions made within the 
French criminal justice system. We combine original administrative data on all 
criminal records for jury trials in France between 2004 and 2010 (a total of 16,342 
criminal cases), and data on the content of the main 8PM national TV newscast, 
which is followed by 20% of households in France.3 Because trial start and end dates 
are set months in advance, cases examined are plausibly independent from what is on 
the news at the time of a particular trial. Empirically, cases examined are similar 
regardless of what kind of news stories run immediately before verdicts are handed 
down. We compare outcomes of trials whose verdicts happen to be rendered just after 
relatively more coverage of crimes unrelated to the case at hand, versus those 
preceded by relatively less coverage. We examine jury decisions for both convictions 
and sentences. We rule out reverse causality – the possibility that TV could reflect 
ongoing trials – by focusing on stories that do not mention trials or legislation, and by 
demonstrating that coverage of crimes is not influenced by ongoing trials. 
																																																								
2 Danziger et al (2011). Other papers have looked at the degree to which common psychological biases 
like the gambler’s fallacy apply to judges (Chen et al, 2014). Compared to research on judges, there is 
a much larger literature using mock juries (see Devine et al, 2001 for a review).  
3 Authors’ calculations using data from Mediamétrie, a French audience measurement company. Daily 
audiences are included in the main media dataset that we obtained from the French National 
Audiovisual Institute. 
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We find that news stories do not affect convictions. In France, an investigating judge 
decides which cases to bring to criminal court, so jurors examine only relatively 
strong cases that have cleared that hurdle. Only 7% of cases in criminal court end in 
an acquittal.  
Jurors in France also vote on the sentence, and we find that news content on the day 
before the verdict impacts sentence length in jury trials. In criminal courts with lay 
jurors, each additional news story about felonies increases sentences the following 
day by an average of 26 days. Being tried after media coverage of crime (which 
happens for 45% of cases) versus no stories on crime increases sentences by 86 days, 
or close to 3 months.  
In criminal courts in France, sentences for crimes are full years of prison, so in terms 
of magnitude, the average effect of media coverage of crimes can be interpreted as an 
increased likelihood that a person will receive a sentence of at least one extra year in 
prison. The average increase of prison sentences by 3 months after coverage of crime 
translates into one in four defendants receiving one additional year in prison.  
We apply the same methodology to look at the effect of judicial errors on sentencing. 
Coverage of judicial errors is less frequent, and is concentrated around the coverage 
of one particular incident of miscarriage of justice, raising questions of external 
validity. With these caveats in mind, we find that sentences are 40 days shorter after 
coverage of judicial errors, suggesting that jurors adjust sentences both upward and 
downward depending on media coverage of criminal justice issues. These first-order 
results on judicial errors are robust to changing the specification, but results on 
mechanisms are not as robust.  
We hypothesize that news on crime temporarily makes crime more salient in jurors' 
minds. Several facts are consistent with this interpretation. We find that sentences do 
not respond to local variations in the number of crimes, but only to differences in 
media coverage of crime. We then show that while news on the day before a verdict is 
released has a significant effect on sentencing, news further back in time does not, 
even when the trial lasted several days. Looking at a national survey about public 
safety concerns and exploiting variations in the exact timing of the survey date, we 
find that the people are more likely to report "feeling unsafe" on the day after more 
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media coverage of crime; but in that case also, the effect tapers off quickly. 
Furthermore, our effects are driven by the presence of crime news rather than the 
amount of it. Finally, we find that sentence lengths vary only with news about 
criminal justice, not with news on other upsetting topics such as natural catastrophes 
or unemployment.  
We explore whether experience and expertise can help mitigate media biases, by 
asking whether judges are less prone to respond to media content. We show in 
different settings that news stories do not affect decisions made by judges. There is no 
effect of media on decisions in corrections courts, where professional judges examine 
misdemeanors. Our analyses focus on the most serious misdemeanors, but we cannot 
reject that this is due to the difference in types of cases being tried. We then exploit a 
discontinuity at age 16, leading felonies to be judged by laypeople, instead of only by 
judges. We find that news stories have no effect on decisions for defendants younger 
than 16 (judged only by professional judges), while they affect sentences in cases 
with defendants older than 16. This suggests that professionalism mitigates the effect 
of domain-pertinent but irrelevant external information, though we note that the 
difference in effect sizes between the two age groups is not statistically significant. 
Lastly, we also find no effect of media in appellate courts, where judges and attorneys 
are more experienced. These results in different contexts suggest that professional 
experience and expertise reduce the effect of domain-pertinent but irrelevant external 
information.  
Our paper provides some of the first quasi-experimental field evidence of the effects 
of irrelevant information on criminal justice outcomes. While several studies look at 
the effect of media on sentencing, they use surveys of jurors (Dowler, 2003; Surette, 
2014), or mock juries (see Greene, 1990, for a review). Some recent papers have used 
data on real convictions, but focus on sentencing variations due to intrinsic 
characteristics of jurors and defendants, including age (Anwar et al, 2014); race 
(Anwar et al, 2012; Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010; Shayo and Zussman, 
2011); or political opinions (Anwar et al, 2015). Other work looks at how consistent 
media coverage of courts can influence judges’ decisions by increasing accountability 
(Lim et al 2015; Lim, 2015).  
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature showing how news provision and its 
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biases influence policy-relevant behaviors (reviewed in DellaVigna and La Ferrara, 
2015), including voter turnout (Gentzkow, 2006; Cagé, 2013); corruption (Ferraz and 
Finan, 2008); political accountability (Snyder and Strömberg, 2010); election results 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Gerber et al, 2009; Enikolopov et al, 2011); or 
conflicts (Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). More broadly, audiovisual content can also affect 
offending (Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009), adolescent attitudes (Kearney and Levine, 
2015), and fertility (La Ferrara et al, 2012). We show that there can be large impacts 
from small variations in what media coverage puts top-of-the-mind before a decision. 
This factor is somewhat accounted for by modern democracies: for example, in 
France, the media may not interview candidates or publish polls the day before an 
election; in the United States, juries may be isolated during a trial so that they will not 
be influenced by media coverage of the case they are considering.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe French 
institutions and the data we use. Section 3 discusses our identification strategy. 
Section 4 presents the effect of media on juror decisions, and section 5 explores 
mechanisms. Section 6 turns to the effects of media content on judges’ decisions, and 
section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Institutions and Data  
 
2.1. French Courts 
There are three types of criminal courts in France: corrections courts (tribunal 
correctionnel), criminal courts (cour d’assises), and juvenile courts (tribunal pour 
enfants). If the maximum sentence for an offense is less than 10 years, it is tried in 
corrections court; if the maximum sentence is more than 10 years, the offense is tried 
in criminal court. For simplicity, we refer to cases judged in criminal court as 
“felonies,” even though they represent only a small subset of all felonies – the most 
severe ones.4 Defendants younger than 18 at the time of misdemeanors, or 16 at the 
time of felonies, are judged in juvenile court. While offenders may admit guilt in 																																																								
4 Using the criminal record data described below, we find that only about 0.5% of criminal cases are 
tried in criminal court, and that these are mainly cases of murder, forcible rape, armed robbery, and 
aggravated assaults leading to permanent disability. The vast majority of cases, including many 
felonies, are tried in corrections court. 
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court, there is no plea-bargaining procedure for felonies: all felony defendants have to 
go to trial. Importantly for our purposes, this means that the selection of felony cases 
that go to trial cannot depend on what is in the news. 
Guilt and sentencing are both determined on the day of the verdict in criminal court. 
Criminal courts examine about 3,000 cases per year. Judicial decisions are made by a 
jury of nine (first instance) or twelve (appeals) civilian jurors and three judges.5 
Defendants are tried in the county (département) where the offense occurred in first 
instance trials, and in a different county within the same judicial region for appellate 
trials.  
Jurors are randomly drawn from among French citizens older than 23 who are 
registered to vote. A pool of forty potential jurors is selected for a court session, 
which typically lasts about two weeks, during which one to ten cases are heard, with 
each trial generally lasting two or three days. All forty jurors show up to court at the 
beginning of each case, and members of the jury are selected at random. Attendance 
is mandatory, with a compensation of roughly 100 USD per day in court. The defense 
attorneys and prosecutor are allowed to exclude 5 and 4 jurors, respectively. 
However, unlike in the U.S., there is no questioning of potential jurors and selection 
relies on very little information: name, age, gender, occupation, and a person’s 
demeanor as they walk to the jury box. Importantly for our work, this means that 
jurors cannot be excluded based on their consumption of media or their perception of 
current events.  
The jury first votes on culpability. There is a single vote on guilt, and a conviction 
needs a two-thirds majority. Only 6% to 7% of defendants are acquitted in criminal 
court.6 This low number is likely due to the fact that investigating judges have to 
decide that there is enough evidence against the defendant for the case to be pursued 
in criminal court. Though these numbers are not directly comparable, in the U.S., 
																																																								
5 In this paper, we examine pre-2012 institutions. Since 2012, these numbers went down to 6 and 9 
jurors, respectively. One of the three judges, known as the president, leads the trial. Very high-profile 
cases, in particular linked to terrorism, are judged solely by judges. 
6 Calculated by the authors using official statistics on overall outcomes of trials from the Ministry of 
Justice (Ministère de la Justice (2012), p. 127). Chaussebourg and Lumbroso (2008) look at appellate 
cases, and find a rate of acquittal of 7% for this subset of cases – which is low, given the selection. For 
the counties for which we have data on acquittals, we find that 7.5% of cases ended in an acquittal.  
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acquittals represent only 1% of felony case outcomes (Reaves, 2013).7 In England and 
Wales, 11.9% of offenders judged by Crown courts were found not guilty.8 
If the defendant is found guilty, the jurors vote on sentence length immediately after. 
Each juror writes down a sentence length. There are as many iterations of this vote as 
needed for one sentence length to obtain a strict majority (according to articles 355 to 
365 of the French penal code). There are no strict sentencing guidelines in France: the 
minimum possible sentence in criminal court is generally one year, or two years if the 
maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Sentences in criminal courts are typically 
given in increments of full years.  
For criminal cases, investigations typically take a long time: the median length of 
investigation is 3.5 years.9 Court dates are determined months in advance and the jury 
pool receives a notification at least one month before the trial, reinforcing the idea 
that the precise date of a trial is not correlated with events that take place at that time.  
Felonies committed by 16- and 17-year-olds are judged in criminal court, but juvenile 
laws still apply. While possible penalties are less severe than for adults, the structure 
of this criminal court is similar in many ways to adult criminal court, and in particular 
also includes civilian jurors. By contrast, juvenile courts have one judge and two 
assessors, who are appointed for 4 years. About 350 felonies committed by offenders 
under the age of 16 are tried each year, and about 300 juveniles aged 16 to 17 years 
old are tried for felonies in criminal court.10  
 
 
2.2. Court Data 
Our main data source on sentencing is criminal records (casier judiciaire), kept by the 
																																																								
7 The acquittal rate is much higher for offenders who go to jury trial. For example, Anwar et al. (2012) 
find that about 27% of jury trials in Florida lead to no guilty conviction, but less than 10% of 
defendants actually have a jury trial. The remaining 90% plead guilty, leading to the very low overall 
acquittal rates. Since there are no plea bargains in France, the relevant comparison acquittal rate would 
be acquittals of all felony defendants, and not only those decided in a jury trial. 
8 Ministry of Justice (2013), p.31. 
9 See table 1. Investigation length is defined as the time between crime and trial, so it is the sum of the 
time between crime and arrest, and time between arrest and trial. While we cannot parse these out in 
our data, on average nationally, there are 24 – 26 months between crime and arrest, and 34 – 36 months 
between arrest and trial (Ministère de la Justice (2012), p. 127).  
10 Authors’ calculations, using court data, presented in table 7. 
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French Ministry of Justice. Criminal records have one observation per criminal court 
conviction. No criminal record is kept if the trial ended in an acquittal. Criminal 
records are collected for administrative purposes: judges check them at trial, they are 
(very selectively) used for background checks, and the French Ministry of Justice uses 
them for statistical purposes. They contain information on the date and county of 
conviction, offenses (type of offense, date of offense) and sentences, as well as basic 
socio-demographic information such as age, gender, and nationality. We analyze 
outcomes for convictions from between 2004 and 2010.  
The upper part of table 1 presents descriptive statistics on adult convictions in 
criminal court between 2004 and 2010. Felony defendants are mostly male (94%) and 
French (88%); they are 38.6 years old on average, and 36% have had some past 
conviction. Forcible rape is the most frequent crime tried in criminal courts (47%). 
The average sentence is around 10 years, with up to 15 years for murder.11 
In order to fully understand how media might influence criminal court outcomes, we 
sought to obtain data on acquittals and trial length (criminal records report only the 
date of the verdict). Some court clerks keep this information on annotated court 
schedules, so we contacted all 95 counties, and 44 were willing to share their court 
schedules. Of these, 25 counties had annotated schedules, which included information 
on trial outcomes, and allow us to determine whether a defendant was convicted, 
acquitted, or appealed the decision.12 For this subsample, there are 514 acquittals for 
6,769 trials (7.6%). The remaining 19 counties did not have information on acquittals, 
but their schedules include trial start dates. In online appendix A, we provide more 
details on these subsamples. The cases in these subsamples are very similar to our 
main sample in terms of defendant characteristics, crimes, and sentences. The main 
results in this paper use the criminal records dataset, and we specify when we use the 
criminal court schedule datasets. 
 																																																								
11 Only 3.5% of sentences are fully suspended and 84% of sentences are only prison time (no part of 
which is suspended). We code life imprisonment sentences as being equal to 32 years, which is the 
highest sentence other than life imprisonment. Only 0.64% of sentences are life sentences; and we 
show that our results are robust to dropping life sentences (online appendix table D4, column 2). 
12 What exactly appears on the court schedule is left to the court’s discretion. Some courts update their 
schedules after the trial and include information on the outcome of the trial, while others do not. We 
noted no particular pattern according to which courts update their schedules to include information on 
trial outcomes. 
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2.3. French Television: Viewership and Data 
Television is a popular source of information in France, with two channels splitting 
most of the audience shares: TF1, a privately owned, non-cable channel, draws 
between 31.8% (2004) and 24.5% (2010) of viewers; France 2, a public channel, 
draws between 20.5% (2004) and 16.1% (2010) of viewers. In particular, the 8PM 
news programs are very popular and influential, so much so that they are often 
dubbed the “8PM mass.” The 8PM TF1 and France 2 news programs have average 
audiences of 8 million and 5 million viewers per day, respectively (from a population 
of 65 million in France).13 Both programs last roughly 40 minutes. Programming on 
free audiovisual media (including TF1 and France 2) is mandated to be non-partisan. 
This neutrality is enforced by the Superior Counsel of Audiovisual Media (CSA).  
The National Audiovisual Institute archives all 8PM news broadcasts. We collected 
data on TF1 and France 2 news broadcasts from between 2004 and 2010. For each 
news story, we have information on the title, date, place, and length of the story, and a 
list of keywords describing its content. Archive staff assign those keywords using a 
precise standardized list. There is an average of 24 stories per day, per channel. Since 
we are most interested in the effect of jurors’ environment on sentencing, we limit our 
sample to national news, which represents an average of 15 stories per day.14 We also 
obtained from the National Audiovisual Institute information on viewership for each 
news broadcast, as calculated by Médiamétrie. 
We use the keywords describing the content of each story to construct indicators of 
coverage of crime and criminal justice. We kept keywords that appear more than 20 
times between 2004 and 2010 (2,636 words – more than 80% of all keywords). We 
grouped them into categories relevant to measuring coverage of crime and criminal 
justice: felonies, criminal law, trials, and judicial errors. Using this keyword 
classification, we then calculate the number of news stories per day that include 
keywords on felonies and judicial errors, and the number of minutes devoted to these 
subjects. 
																																																								
13 The figures on viewership in this paragraph are based on the authors’ calculations using data from 
Mediamétrie, a French audience measurement company. This data was included in the main media 
dataset. 
14 Authors’ calculations, using the main media dataset.	
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We also create a measure for stories about crimes committed (henceforth labeled 
“perpetrated felonies”), which are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. We identify these as news stories including “felony” keywords, but no 
“criminal justice” keywords, such as “trial,” “verdict,” “court,” “hearing,” or 
“appeal.” Appendix A presents the full list of words used to construct these measures.  
For each day and each topic, we construct three measures: number of stories, number 
of minutes, and dummies for whether these topics were covered at all. Stories from 
both TV channels, TF1 and France 2, are grouped together in our measures. Figure 1 
illustrates variations over time in stories on crime: there is substantial variation in 
coverage of crime. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the coverage of stories 
between 2004 and 2010. While there are many stories about crime, with a lot of daily 
variation, news on miscarriage of justice is rarer, and at least 75% of these stories 
relate to the infamous “Outreau trial,”15 in which a dozen people had been wrongly 
convicted for sexual abuse on children, based on false witness testimony. Since 
stories about judicial error most often relate to this single event, our main results 
focus on coverage of crimes.  
 
2.4. Crime  
We compute the number of crimes per county using two data sources. First, we use 
official police statistics, which report the monthly number of offenses per county. 
This data is publicly available on the open data platform of the French government 
(www.data.gouv.fr). We calculate the number of felonies per county and per month. 
There are on average 18 felonies per county and per month recorded by the police, 
amounting to about 1,736 felonies per month in France. In figure 2, we present the 
monthly variation in number of felonies and number of media stories on crime 
between 2004 and 2010. The variation in number of media stories on crime in a given 
																																																								
15 We calculate this percentage by looking at the number of stories on judicial errors that include one of 
two words: “Outreau” or “Burgaud” (the judge in charge of that case). This gives us a lower bound for 
the percent of stories on judicial errors that are about the Outreau case, since some other coverage on 
Outreau may not have included direct mentions of either.  
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month does not directly match the variation in number of offenses.16 
Our second measure of crime comes from the criminal records data presented in 
section 2.2. Criminal records include the date that the crime was committed. Using 
data for 2004-2015, we can determine the number of crimes that led to a conviction in 
the following years, at the day and county level.17 
The two datasets have different strengths and weaknesses. The police data records all 
crimes, but is available only at the month level. Criminal records capture offending at 
the day level, but only keep track of crimes for which a person was convicted. Note 
also that court data is at the offender level, while police data is at the crime level; 
therefore, court statistics yield slightly higher overall numbers than police statistics, 
since one crime could have multiple perpetrators.  
 
2.5. Perceptions of Crime 
Lastly, we use a national victimization survey to get a measure of people’s perception 
of safety and insecurity. This survey has been administered each year since 2007 by 
the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), and we 
used data collected from 2008 to 2010.18 Roughly 17,000 people are surveyed each 
year, so there are 50,817 respondents over the period from 2008 to 2010. We obtained 
from INSEE a specific dataset containing the exact date that each survey was 
administered. In order to measure people’s perception of safety, we use the answer to 
the following question: “Do you sometimes feel insecure in your neighborhood?” The 
possible responses are: never (77.6%), rarely (9.5%), sometimes (9.5%), and 
frequently (3.2%). 
 
 																																																								
16 At the yearly level, the number of news stories on crimes is correlated with the number of actual 
felonies, as shown appendix figure B1. It is only in the short run that variations in crimes differ from 
media coverage thereof.  
17 We exclude offenses that take place on the first day of the month, since these capture all offenses 
whose date is uncertain. 58% of the cases are tried within 5 years of the offense date, and 80% with 7 
years. Our “criminal records” measure of offending captures more offenses at the beginning of the 
2004-2010 period than at the end of that period.  
18 A complete description of the survey (in French) can be found at: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=sources/ope-enq-victimation.htm 
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3. Empirical Strategy  
Our main identification strategy exploits variations in the exact timing of news stories 
and trials. We compare verdicts handed down just after more coverage of crime to 
verdicts handed down following less media coverage of crime. We investigate the 
effect of media on two main outcomes: conviction and sentence length. Since trial 
dates in France are set months in advance, the exact day of a trial is plausibly 
unrelated to the content of news on the day before the verdict (more discussion of this 
below). We estimate equations of the form:  Y!,!,! =  αMedia!!! +  βX! +  γ!! + δZ! + ε!,!,! (1) 
With the assumption that the conditional mean of the errors is zero:  !(ε!,!,! | Media!!!,X!,!! , Z!) = 0 (2) Y!,!,! is the trial outcome (conviction or sentence length) for person i whose verdict 
happened at date t in county j; Media!!! captures measures of media coverage on 
relevant topics k days before the verdict; X!  controls for time (day of the week, 
calendar month and year fixed effects); !! controls for county of trial; Z! controls for 
defendant characteristics (offense, type of court (appellate court, normal court), age, 
gender, a dummy for French citizenship, pre-trial custody (number of days), 
investigation length (number of days), and number of prior convictions in the past 
five years). Standard errors are clustered at the county level, unless otherwise 
specified. 
In our main specifications, we define “Media” as the number of news stories on a 
given topic, and we present results for k = 1: in this case, we measure the effect of 
news stories on the day before the verdict. Using the same basic structure, we can 
conduct a “placebo experiment” by looking at the effect of media after the verdict on 
a trial’s outcome, since posterior events cannot influence that trial’s outcomes. We 
also run specifications that include measures of news stories on the day before and the 
day after the verdict. In our main analyses, we do not include media content on the 
day of the verdict, since its effect is a priori ambiguous. While the 8PM news 
broadcast that takes place on the day after the verdict could not influence a trial’s 
outcome, some of the events covered on the 8PM news on the day of the verdict 
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might also have appeared in morning papers and radio shows. Therefore, this news on 
the day of the verdict cannot be seen unequivocally as news “before” or “after” a 
verdict.  
Identification rests on the assumption that the exact timing of trials is not related to 
TV coverage of crime and criminal justice. One might worry about reverse causality – 
more serious trials are more likely to be covered on TV. Note first that most felonies 
and most trials do not make national news. Furthermore, several years typically go by 
between offenses and trials, so on any given date, crimes that are being covered are 
not those that are being tried. Another concern is selection bias: attorneys could factor 
in public sentiment when choosing the trial dates, trying to avoid periods of higher 
crime coverage. However, trial dates are set several months in advance, as a function 
of availabilities of judges, attorneys and courtrooms. Trial length is determined before 
the schedule is set, based on the number of experts and witnesses. Jurors are 
summoned at least 30 days before the trial starts. So while season or month (which we 
control for) could potentially be manipulated, last-minute planning to avoid a trial in 
an unfavorable media climate seems very unlikely. 
Table 2 presents the correlation between characteristics of cases being tried and 
coverage of felonies and judicial errors at t-1. Each panel represents independent 
regressions – we examine the effect on sentence length of three different types of 
news: news about perpetrated felonies (which we define as stories about crimes that 
do not mention trials or legislation); about all felonies (including stories on trials and 
legislation); and about judicial errors. For most covariates, differences across media 
contexts are not statistically significant, and when significant, the point estimates are 
small. In particular, observables are balanced across media coverage of perpetrated 
offenses, which is our main measure of crime coverage. For our secondary measure of 
media coverage of crime – which includes trials and laws – investigations are longer 
after coverage of crime. This could be because trials after long investigations have a 
higher probability of being covered in the media. However, importantly for our 
identification strategy, the last column of table 2 shows that trial length is not 
correlated with media content on the day before the verdict, confirming that it is not 
strategically manipulated based on news content. These analyses validate our 
identification strategy: the exact timing of cases is orthogonal to news coverage of 
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offenses.  
To further address the potential concern that media could cover information on 
upcoming judicial decisions, our preferred estimates look at the effect of news stories 
about current crimes and violent offenses, excluding stories about trials (“perpetrated 
felonies”). As part of our robustness checks, we also exclude stories about crimes that 
took place in the same county as the trial, to make sure that there could not be overlap 
between the case tried and news story examined. Appendix table E6 shows that only 
2% of stories on crimes took place in the same county as the trial and only 7% took 
place in an adjacent county. 
Another concern could be that there would be more coverage of (unrelated) crime 
stories when there are more high-profile court cases, because the public’s interest in 
crime would increase.19 Appendix B shows that there is little empirical relationship 
between the amount of news on crime and the amount of news on trials.  
We investigate the effect of media on two main outcomes: conviction and sentence 
length. Sentence length is only observed in case of conviction. If media has an effect 
on acquittals, then our estimates of the effect of news on sentencing would likely be 
biased by selection (Lee 2009). 
 
4. Media Coverage and Jurors' Decisions in Criminal Court 
 
4.1. Media Coverage and Jury Conviction 
We first measure the effect of news coverage of crime on acquittals. This information 
is available only for the subsample of 25 counties that provided data on acquittals, 
since criminal records in France report only convictions (see online appendix A for 
more details). Results are presented in the first four columns of table 3. Each panel of 
the table represents independent regressions: the effect of news about felonies 
perpetrated, about all felonies, and about judicial errors is examined separately.  
News stories about perpetrated felonies (panel A) have no impact on convictions. 																																																								
19 Conversely, time constraints could make news about trials limit coverage of perpetrated felonies. 
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News stories about felonies in general (panel B, including news on upcoming trials) at 
t-1 are marginally associated with more acquittals, but the effect is both small and not 
robust.20  
We now move to the effect of media on sentence length. Since media does not affect 
acquittals, the sample of defendants for whom we observe sentences is similar 
regardless of coverage of crime and judicial errors on the day preceding the verdict.21  
 
4.2. Media Coverage and Sentence Length: Jury Decisions  
We now turn to the effect of media content on sentence length. We use the full sample 
of criminal records, since jurors determine sentences for all convictions. Our main 
results are presented in columns 5 to 8 of table 3. As for acquittals, each panel 
presents results for independent regressions. Column 5 presents regression results 
with no controls, and columns 6 to 8 include controls for case characteristics. 
Panels A and B respectively present the effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
(excluding stories on trials and legislation) and all news about felonies. We find 
significant impacts on sentence length of news about crimes. For each additional story 
on felonies, sentences handed down the day after the stories run are 24 days longer on 
average. Results are similar for perpetrated felonies. The difference between these 
two measures is that one includes trials; the other does not. This indicates that 
coverage of crimes, not coverage of trials, affects sentences. These results hold with 
and without controls. 
Reassuringly, we find no difference in sentences depending on the content of news 
stories on the day after the verdict (columns 7 and 8): none of the coefficients are 
significant. Point estimates are small, with large standard errors. In addition, point 
estimates for news at t-1 and t+1 are marginally statistically different for perpetrated 
felonies (p-value = 0.0651). This indicates that civilian jurors respond to the context 
in which they are making judicial decisions: cases that are otherwise similar tend to 
																																																								
20 Robustness tests are presented in online appendix tables D1and D2. 
21 We discuss this point further in online appendix D (table D3 and discussion).		
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get longer sentences when tried after more media reports.22 
Why are sentences, but not convictions, affected by media? One candidate 
explanation stems from the difference in how juries vote on convictions and 
sentences. Since a single vote determines conviction, the marginal voter would have 
to be affected by media for there to be an effect on conviction. Conversely, sentences 
are reached through a convergence process; and so any juror may be able to influence 
the ultimate decision through this iterative voting. Another interpretation could be that 
news stories are more likely to change the perception of crimes’ severity, and not the 
strength of the evidence in the case at hand. 
 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
The first concern that we address is that the effect of media on sentences could be 
counterbalanced by more appeals after coverage of crimes (from the defense) or 
criminal justice (from the prosecutors). Overall, 14.4% of first instance cases are 
appealed. This could be driving the null result on convictions, and lead to an 
understatement of the effects of media on sentencing, if we observe only cases that 
were not appealed. We investigate this using the date of the first instance proceeding, 
which is recorded in the court data: when cases were appealed, we only keep the first 
instance proceeding.23 All verdict dates are thus now first appearance dates, and we 
create a dummy equal to one if a case was appealed, our outcome of interest here. 
Results are presented in column 1 of table 4. All coefficients are non-significant and 
point estimates are extremely small. News stories do not impact appeals. This also 
confirms the idea that media does not impact conviction.  
In column 2, we present the effect of news on log sentences, this measure being more 
robust to outliers. News at t-1 remains significant while news at t+1 is not. In column 
3, we replicate our results excluding trials that took place in the same county as 
stories about crime covered the day before or after, as an additional step to make sure 																																																								
22 Results are similar when we use the subsample for which we have additional information and, in 
particular, the subsample used in section 4.1 for results on acquittals (see online appendix table D4). 
23 Since appeals generally take time, we look at appeals judged up to 2012, for cases whose first 
instance was prior to 2010. This allows us to capture virtually all appeals cases between 2004 and 
2010. 
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that there could be no possible overlap between the case tried and news story 
examined. Results are extremely close to those presented in table 3.  
Another concern might be around differential selection of jurors, based on exposure to 
coverage of crime. As was outlined in section 2, in the French context, potential jurors 
can be excluded based only on minimal information. In particular, people are not 
questioned before being included in a jury, and so attorneys have no information on 
their relation to media or current events. One might still worry that a different set of 
jurors could be selected the day after news stories about crime than would have been 
selected the day before. While unlikely, we control for this scenario by running our 
main regressions for a subsample of trials that last more than one day, among the 
sample of cases for which we know trial length. For those trials, jury selection took 
place before the 8PM news broadcasts of the day before sentencing, and could not be 
influenced by news. Results are presented in column 4 of table 4. They are similar to 
those obtained for all cases.  
The remainder of table 4 shows that our results are robust to variations in the exact 
kind of media coverage, and time controls. In column 5, standard errors are clustered 
by day. In column 6, we control for session fixed effects, for the subsample for which 
we have information on session (see online appendix A for the description of the 
subsample). This is a very stringent specification, since each session contains four 
trials on average. In column 7, we add county-month specific time trends. Results are 
close to those obtained in section 4.3.  
In column 8, we vary our measure of media coverage and exposure. In our main 
results, we used number of news stories covering felonies. Here, we use the length of 
media coverage in minutes. Our results tell the same story with this measure of news. 
Results are similar if we look at the effect of each TV channel – TF1 or FR2 – alone 
(see online appendix table E5). 
 
4.4. Magnitude of Effects 
Our main results imply that each additional news story on crime increases sentence 
length by 26 days on average, for a 0.7% increase in sentence length per additional 
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story on crime. The first column of table 5 presents a regression of sentence length on 
a dummy equal to one if there is at least one news story on crime on the day before 
the verdict. We find that being tried after a news story on crime, versus no story on 
crime increases sentences by three months (86 days), which is an average of a 2.4% 
increase in sentence length. In this subsection, we first contrast these magnitudes to 
those found in the experimental literature and in field evaluations of the effect of 
extraneous factors on sentencing, and then unpack these average effects in terms of 
sentence distribution. 
Our average effects are small relative to those in lab experiments testing the effect of 
biases on sentencing. To take a few examples, Englich et al. (2001) and Englich et al. 
(2006) find sentences to be 20% to 33% higher, both for professionals and for lay 
people, after being presented a high versus low sentence anchor. Ogloff and Vidmar 
(1994) find that mock jurors exposed to TV excerpts of testimonies of sexual abuse 
victims chose hypothetical sentences 30% higher than mock jurors exposed to less 
emotional narratives. The fact that our results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained in lab experiments, but quantitatively smaller, is in line with the lab study of 
many other mechanisms (Dahl and Della Vigna 2009, see also Kessler and Vesterlund 
2015).  
 
The effects that we find are closer in magnitude to those found in field evaluations of 
the effect of extraneous factors on sentencing.24 Eren and Mocan (2016) find that 
juvenile sentences increase by 35 days, or 6%, after “surprise losses” of the football 
team from the judge’s alma mater. Abrams and Yoon (2007) find that an attorney 
with 11 years of experience will, on average, obtain sentences that are 1.2 months 
shorter than someone with only one year of experience, representing a 17% decrease 
in sentence length. Lim et al. (2015) find that a one standard-deviation increase in 
coverage of court activities increases the average sentence length of nonpartisan 
elected judges for homicides, sexual assaults, and robberies by about 5.7 months 
(3.4%).  
 																																																								
24 Many recent empirical papers look at convictions rather than sentence length (Anwar et al., 2012, 
2014; Chen et al., 2016), and so we cannot directly compare magnitudes of effects. The same applies to 
a lot of the mock jury work, which focuses on convictions (for reviews: see Greene, 1990, or Devine et 
al., 2001).  
		 20	
Average effects do not fully capture how media affects sentencing, and in particular 
may not be the best way to interpret magnitudes. Figure 3 plots the sentence 
distribution, depending on whether there was some coverage of crime on TV on the 
day before the verdict or not. This graph indicates that, in France, sentences for 
crimes are full years of prison. So another way to interpret the average effects is that 
media content increases the likelihood that a person will be sentenced to a higher 
sentencing bracket of at least one year.25  
 
Figure 3 also suggests that the difference in sentences after news about crime appears 
for longer sentences. This graphical intuition is confirmed using quantile regressions, 
using controls for offender characteristics, offense and day of the week fixed effects 
(online appendix C). These results suggest that media coverage of crime affects 
sentences in the distribution. We estimate, for example, that an additional news story 
increases the 90th percentile sentence by more than 150 days. Note that except for the 
top deciles of the treatment effect of news stories on crime, most of the quantile 
regression coefficients are not significantly different from one another when we 
include controls. 
 
 
4.5. Judicial Errors 
In panel C of tables 3 and 4, we look at the effect of media coverage of judicial errors 
on sentencing. As with crimes, we find that news stories on judicial errors have no 
impact on convictions (table 3, panel C, columns 1–4). Moving to sentence length, 
one additional story on judicial errors (table 3, panel C, columns 5–8) decreases 
sentences by 40 days. Those results are robust to many different specifications (table 
4, panel C). This suggests that news can sway jurors in both directions – toward more 
severity after coverage of crimes, and less severity after coverage of judicial errors. In 
column 9 of table 4, we jointly test the effect of news stories about perpetrated 
felonies, felonies other than perpetrated felonies (coverage of legal discussions and 
trials), and judicial errors. The effect of coverage of perpetrated felonies and judicial 
errors remains similar to what was observed before. The effect of news stories about 																																																								
25 The average increase of prison sentences by 3 months after coverage of crime in fact means that one 
quarter of defendants received one additional year in prison, if we assume that news on TV doesn’t 
cause rank reversals in sentences. 
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“felonies other than perpetrated” is not significant.  
However, as mentioned earlier, stories on judicial errors almost exclusively relate to 
the Outreau case, in which false testimonies resulted in several innocent suspects 
spending years in jail, and one defendant who even died while incarcerated. The 
Outreau miscarriage of justice was covered at various points in time (see online 
appendix figure F1), and our identification exploits various moments when Outreau 
came up. However, this context does not allow us to say whether our results would 
hold for less extreme cases of miscarriage of justice. By contrast, news about felonies 
are frequent and refer to many different events.  
We now turn to mechanism. While the first-order results on judicial errors are robust, 
our analysis of mechanisms for judicial errors is not as robust. In the remainder of the 
paper, we focus on the effects of coverage of crime. Similar analyses for judicial error 
are presented in online appendix F. 
 
 
5. Mechanisms of Media Influence: Social Trends, Mood, or “Top of the 
Mind”? 
The effect on sentencing decisions of exposure to news about crime and criminal 
justice could be explained by several mechanisms. Jurors might be responding to 
changes in the prevalence of crime; media coverage might alter perceptions of crime 
or criminal justice; media coverage could affect people’s overall mood; or media 
coverage could increase what is “top of the mind” at a given moment.  
In this section, we show that news coverage of crime, beyond increases or decreases 
in the prevalence of crime, affects judicial decisions. We further show that media 
content has a very short-lived effect: only news on the day before a verdict affects 
sentencing, but news further back in time does not. Using a nationally representative 
survey on perceptions of safety and security, we show that the same holds true for 
people’s perception of insecurity. Lastly, we show that this effect is not driven by 
mood changes: we find that coverage of other “bad news” does not affect sentencing. 
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5.1. Crime Versus Media Coverage of Crime 
Are jurors responding to real changes in crime that are reflected in the news, or are 
they affected by crime showing up on the news? If coverage of felonies is correlated 
with frequency of crime, our results could be explained by two causal chains. When 
there is more crime (and greater TV coverage of crime), jurors might be more likely 
to have been victims or to know victims of crime, or be more generally concerned 
about longer-term trends in crime, and to reflect that in their sentencing choices. 
Alternatively, media coverage may increase the saliency or visibility of crime, or 
trigger emotional responses. In that case, the effect would be driven by news coverage 
and not by the prevalence of crime. 
A first way to explore whether people are reacting to crime first-hand or coverage of 
crime is to contrast the effect of stories on crimes within one’s county or outside. As a 
reminder, column 3 of table 4 shows that point estimates do not change much when 
looking at crime stories that took place outside one’s county. When further breaking 
out news “outside one’s county” to news about crimes in adjacent counties or further 
away, the latter remains significant and similar to our main estimates.26 
A second way to distinguish the effect of news from the effect of crime is to include 
controls for crime. As discussed in section 2.4, figure 2 shows that news on crime and 
crimes registered by the police were not correlated in the short run, giving us leverage 
to tease out the effect of crime versus coverage of crime. In columns 2 and 3 of table 
5, we include measures of numbers of felonies. Column 2 controls for month by 
county number of felonies using police data, and column 3 controls for day by county 
numbers of crimes that led to a conviction, using court data (see section 2.4 for more 
details on these measures). Controlling for crimes does not affect our media point 
estimates. The effect of local crime on sentences is open to more than one 
interpretation. Daily crime measured using court data has no effect on sentences, but 
monthly felonies measured using police data has a negative, marginally significant, 
effect on sentences. 
																																																								
26 This result, consistent with the idea that media coverage, not crime, is affecting sentences, is 
presented in the online appendix table E7. While estimates for coverage of crime within one’s county 
or a neighboring county are imprecise (potentially due to the rarity of such events, shown in table E6), 
this indicates that our main results are not driven by coverage of crime to which a juror may directly or 
indirectly have been exposed. 
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5.2. Effects of Media Exposure  
We next explore whether news stories covered when TV audiences are higher have a 
greater effect on sentences. We split TV audiences around the median, and look at the 
effect of media on sentences after audiences below median (column 4) or above the 
median (column 5). Effects are bigger and point estimates are always significant when 
audiences are above the median, while they are not when audiences are below the 
median. Although this difference in point estimates is not significant (the p-value is 
equal to 0.67 for the effect of news about perpetrated crime and 0.57 for all news 
about crime), this suggests that more exposure to news on crimes increases the 
likelihood of sentences responding to crime.27 Note that audience rates could be 
correlated to what is covered on TV – more people watch the news if it covers 
horrible crimes – and so we cannot exclude that crimes covered on high audience 
days differ from those covered on low audience days. 
Taken together, these results go against the hypothesis that the effect of media on 
sentences reflects changes in crime. Instead, this suggests that there is a direct effect 
on sentencing of the prevalence of crime in the news. 
 
5.3. Saliency Versus Information Gathering: Short and Long-Term Effects 
In the previous subsections, we showed that news coverage of crime matters 
independent of possible effects of trends in crime. Turning to an analysis of the 
duration of the effects, we show that our results are most consistent with short-lived 
changes in perceptions of crime.  
Figure 4 presents coefficients for a regression which includes both leads and lags in 
news coverage of crime, relative to the date of the verdict. We find that only TV news 
on the day before a verdict affects sentencing: more news coverage of crimes at t-2 or 																																																								
27 There are on average 15.1 million viewers when the audience is above the median, and 12.6 million 
viewers when the audiences is below the median. In the “above median” sample, the probability that at 
least one juror watched the 8PM news the day before is 91% versus 86% for the “below median” 
sample. The average number of viewers among 9 jury members is 2.1 in the “above median” sample 
and 1.9 in the “below median.” Furthermore, audiences could be correlated with the severity of crime, 
and so these results could also be driven by unobservable differences in what kinds of crimes coverage 
draws larger audiences. This similarity could explain why the effects are not significantly different. 
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further back does not affect sentencing. One could argue that this pattern comes from 
the fact that judges and jury members pay attention to information only when it is 
relevant to their decision-making – i.e., when they have to make a judgment. We 
explore this in two ways. 
First, if seeking to collect information before making a judicial decision, people 
would likely pay attention to news during the whole length of the trial and not just on 
the day before the verdict. Using the subsample of cases for which we have trial start 
date, and for which the trials lasts more than two days, we test this hypothesis by 
measuring the effect of news at t-1 and t-2 on the verdict. Results are presented in 
column 6 of table 5. We find that while news on the day before the verdict affects 
sentences, news stories during the trial but prior to the day before the verdict have no 
effect. The sample is smaller than our main sample, and difference between news at t-
2 and news at t-1 is not significant for news about perpetrated crimes (P-value equal 
to 0.3) but significant at the 5% level for news on crime in general. 
In order to further test the role of information gathering, we look at the effect of 
media on the intensive versus extensive margin. We regress sentences on a dummy 
equal to one if there was media coverage of crime on the day before the verdict and 
on the number of news stories (table 5, column 7). All the effect comes from the 
extensive margin: while having been exposed to stories on crime before the verdict 
affects sentences, there is no additional contribution of each additional story. 
Assuming that each additional story would provide more information on crimes, this 
result is less consistent with learning and seems to us more consistent with news 
putting crime on top of people’s mind.  
 
5.4. Effects of Crime News on Salience of Crime  
To further uncover what mechanisms may be explaining our results, we use responses 
to a nationally representative survey on perceptions of public safety and insecurity 
from between 2008 and 2010. This allows us to explore whether media coverage of 
crime directly influences perceptions of crime. The survey takes 3-4 months to 
administer, and some people will be surveyed after more coverage of crime, and 
others after less. We exploit this variation to see if media content affects responses. 
		 25	
Results are presented in column 8 of table 5, and in figure 5. First, survey respondents 
declare more frequently that they feel insecure in their neighborhood on the day after 
news stories about perpetrated felonies. Moreover, this effect is limited in time; only 
news on the day before the survey affects responses. The fact that we replicate our 
main findings in this survey sheds light on mechanisms. First, a random sample of the 
population is affected by media content. This indicates that the effect of media on 
sentences cannot be fully explained by jurors paying more attention to news stories on 
crime because they are making judicial decisions, since people did not know ahead of 
time that they would be administered this survey and had no reason to factor in media 
content in their responses. Second, this makes it unlikely that the influence is fully 
mediated by judges or attorneys leveraging these news stories in their 
recommendations to the jury. This analysis of timing and the survey evidence suggest 
that the effect of media coverage of crime is mediated by crime news making crime 
more salient to jurors. 
 
5.5. Bad News Versus Crime-Specific Information  
Several papers have documented the effect of irrelevant but upsetting information on 
people’s behavior (Card and Dahl, 2011; Chen, 2014). News about crime could be 
just another type of upsetting news, and any bad news might increase sentence length 
because of the bad mood of an individual playing a role in determining the sentence.  
In order to investigate the general effect of bad news on sentence length, we construct 
a database of keywords appearing more than 200 times between 2004 and 2010.28 We 
report the number of stories that contain each keyword per day. Online appendix table 
E1 presents the effect of several types of bad news at t-1 and t+1 on sentences. 
Columns 1–4 document the effect of news stories on strikes, natural disasters, social 
conflict and unemployment,29 while columns 5 and 6 present the effect of news about 
judicial error and murder – the two most common keywords in the judicial error and 
																																																								
28 Those keywords represent less than 2% of the keywords used in the database but around 60% of the 
occurrences (the vast majority of the keywords are used only once). 
29 These keywords have been chosen because they are used more than 1,000 times and capture bad 
news. 
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felony aggregates. For this subset of frequent keywords, only bad news related to 
criminal justice – crimes or judicial errors – has an effect on sentencing.30 
 
5.6. Heterogeneous Effects by Type of Offense Tried and on TV 
 In table 6, we present the effect of news by type of crime covered and by type of 
offense tried.31 Panel A presents the effect of news on all perpetrated felonies, by type 
of offense being tried; panel B distinguishes between news on sexual crimes (0.15 
news story per day), news on murders (0.5 news story per day) and news on other 
kinds of crimes (0.26 news story per day). Column 1 presents results for all offenses 
being tried; and columns 2–5 present the effect of different news on sentences for 
different types crimes: murder, aggravated assaults (including involuntary 
manslaughter and torture), sexual crimes, and property felonies (mainly armed 
robbery). Panel A shows that sexual crimes and property crimes are more influenced 
by news than violent crimes. Moving to the first column of panel B, it appears that 
only news on sexual felonies perpetrated at t-1 appear to be significant. Even if 
coefficients are not significantly different from that for coverage of murders, sexual 
crimes seem to have a greater effect on sentencing.  
Results by crime type (columns 2 to 5) suggest that verdicts are not affected by news 
about crimes of the same type as the one judged. Stories on sexual crimes have 
significantly more effect on trials for violent crime than stories on murders. The 
opposite is true for trials for sexual crimes, though the difference is not significant.  
News stories about murders have no effect on sentences for trials for murder (column 
2) but have a negative effect on aggravated assaults (column 3). This could come 
from a contrast effect. Indeed, crimes aggregated in column 3 are similar but less 
severe than the murders covered by the news. 
 
 																																																								
30 The coefficients for the regression of sentences on news at t-k for different values of k are presented 
in online appendix H. 
31 Further explorations of heterogeneous treatment effects, in particular according to position of the 
news stories in the 8PM news lineup and defendant and juror sociodemographic characteristics, are 
presented in online appendix E. We find no significant differences relative to those factors.  
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6. Professional Judges and Media 
Thus far, our analyses reflect decisions made by a jury that includes civilian jurors 
who have no particular legal or criminal justice experience. Now we ask, how does 
media affect decisions made by professional judges alone? On the one hand, media 
might sway civilian jurors particularly, because they have little experience from 
which to draw other reference points. On the other hand, a lengthy literature has 
shown that professional judges’ decisions are affected by extraneous factors. Ideally, 
we would like to compare how sentences vary by news coverage for similar cases, 
depending on whether a case is judged by only judges, or also by a jury that includes 
civilians. Unfortunately, such a setup does not exist, so we present different strategies 
to get at this question.  
Our first strategy is to look at misdemeanors, which professional judges examine 
alone. We focus on the most severe misdemeanors, but acknowledge that differential 
effects might be driven by the difference in cases examined. We then turn to juvenile 
procedures: before 16, youth are tried in juvenile court (with no lay jurors), and after 
age 16, they are tried in criminal court for felonies. We can exploit this discontinuity 
to contrast the effects of media on professionals versus laypeople. Lastly, we compare 
first instance proceedings to appeals, the latter having more experienced teams of 
judges and attorneys.  
The two first columns of table 7 present characteristics of cases tried in corrections 
courts, for all severe violent misdemeanors (defined as crimes for which the 
maximum sentence in the French Criminal Code is at least seven years, column 1) and 
for the most severe sexual misdemeanors (sexual aggressions for which the maximum 
sentence in the French Criminal Code is at least seven years, column 2). 32 Defendants 
are similar to criminal court defendants in terms of gender and nationality (see table 1 
for comparison), but they tend to be younger (35.4 years old versus 38.6 years old). 
Investigation length is shorter (3 years versus 5 years), and sentences are much 
																																																								
32 In appendix table G1, we provide statistics on all cases judged in corrections courts. Many rapes are 
re-qualified as “sexual aggressions” due to lack of evidence or in order to avoid long investigations and 
trials. In recent years, several bills were introduced to reduce this practice and ensure that all rapes are 
tried in criminal courts (see Senate bill 249, on January 11, 2012 or Senate bill 368, on February 13, 
2014). These cases are therefore cases that legislators are moving to see tried more consistently in 
criminal court. 
		 28	
shorter (1 year versus 10 years), especially when focusing on prison sentences, 
excluding suspended sentences.33  
The first two columns of table 8 present the effect of media on correctional case 
outcomes. As sentences and imprisonment are usually different in correctional courts, 
we present the effect of media on the two different outcomes: the effect of media on 
overall sentence length is presented in panel A; the effect of media on imprisonment 
is presented in panel B. We find that there is no effect of media coverage on either the 
most severe misdemeanors (column 1) or on severe sexual misdemeanors (column 2). 
Not only are the coefficients non-significant; they are also very small, even in terms 
relative to the average sentence (less than 0.4%). Given our sample size, we have a 
well-estimated zero effect. Once again, we cannot rule out the fact that this difference 
is due to differences in the kind of offenses being tried, but this does suggest that 
decisions by professionals are not affected by media.  
Trials for juveniles in France offer a potentially cleaner research design. For felony 
offenses, age at offense determines whether a case is judged in juvenile court or in 
criminal court: before 16, youth are judged in juvenile court, and between 16 and 18 
years old they are judged in juvenile criminal court, which includes 9 civilian jurors.34 
The data confirms that this rule holds empirically: 98.5% of felony offenders less than 
16 years old are tried in juvenile court, and 95% of youth more than 16 years old are 
tried in criminal court, though not as adults. This setup allows us to compare similar 
cases, which based on the age of the defendant will be judged by a jury including 
laypeople. To be charged as felonies, offenses committed by juveniles have to be very 
severe. Columns 3–8 of table 7 compare characteristics of juveniles tried in criminal 
court versus juvenile court. While offending profiles are different (columns 3 and 4) 
for the overall sample, when we limit ourselves to 15- and 16-year-olds (columns 6 
and 7), the crime structure is similar (around 70% of sexual crimes), investigations are 
always very long and socio-demographic status are similar (column 8 presents the P-																																																								
33 In corrections courts, sentences are often a mix of a prison sentence and suspended sentence (for 
example 6 months of imprisonment and 18 months of suspended sentence). Using our sample on 
corrections courts, we calculate that on average, 33% of one’s sentence is a suspended sentence. Only 
20% of defendants have a sentence that is only imprisonment, with no suspended sentence. By contrast, 
in criminal court, on average, 90% of the sentence length is imprisonment, and 84% of sentences 
contain only imprisonment with no suspended prison time. 
34 Criminal courts for juvenile include 9 jury members and three professional judges (like criminal 
courts for adults). In contrast to adult criminal courts, two magistrate assistants have to be specialized 
in juvenile crimes, and the trial is not public. The criminal court for juveniles also judges adults who 
committed crimes with juveniles. In our main specifications, we include only young adults (under 21). 
This threshold corresponds to the age after which prison time must be served in adult facilities. We 
provide more information on juvenile courts in online appendix G.  
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value of the difference). The downside of this strategy, however, is that the sample is 
much smaller, with 2,212 youth tried in juvenile court and 1,842 youth tried in 
juvenile criminal courts between 2004 and 2010.35  
In general, a juvenile’s maximum sentence is half that of an adult, but if a juvenile 
offended between ages 16 and 18, a court can decide not to apply this rule. Another 
major difference is in the fraction of the sentence that is suspended: table 7 shows that 
in juvenile court, 22% of one’s sentence length is imprisonment (the remainder being 
a suspended sentence), versus 74% in juvenile criminal court. Sentences are about 1.8 
times longer in juvenile criminal court, compared to juvenile court. Because of 
deterrence, this change in expected sentences could induce differences in unobserved 
characteristics. While we cannot directly speak to this, the deterrence effect of the 
increase in sentence time among juveniles seems to be quite low (Lee and McCrary, 
2005). Note also that at least for adults, we don’t find the effect of media on sentences 
to change a lot with observable offender characteristics (see online appendix tables 
E3) so even if youth are unobservably different across courts, this exploration of 
heterogeneity for adults suggests that it would not affect our estimates.  
Results are presented in columns 3–6 of table 8. Panel A presents results for sentences 
including suspended sentences, and panel B presents results for imprisonment 
sentences only. Columns 3 and 4 show the effect of media on sentences in juvenile 
criminal court (with civilian jurors), using the number of news stories on crime or a 
dummy for crime being covered. As with adults, sentences are longer after more 
coverage of crimes. Even if the sample is small, the effect of media on the sentences 
for juveniles judged by jurors is significant and similar in magnitude to that presented 
in section 3. However, the results are different in juvenile court, where there are only 
professional judges, as shown in columns 4: estimates are small in magnitude and not 
significant.36 The difference between the effect in criminal court and the effect in 
juvenile court is significant when we use dummies (1% level for news about 
perpetrated crime, 10% level when using all news about crime). 
																																																								
35 We exclude from the analysis offenders who were below the age of 13 (no prison sentence possible), 
or above 21 (necessarily incarcerated in adult facilities, even if judged and convicted together with 
other juveniles). We also exclude judicial decisions that are not made the day of the trial (only 57 
cases), since we cannot precisely date the verdict. 
36 Some coefficients for t+1 are significant. However, they are marginally significant (10%), not robust, 
and go in the opposite direction as those found throughout the paper. 
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The last two columns compare more specifically the effect among offenders at the 16-
year-old age cutoff. The effects of media are less clean, as the samples get very small. 
However, they remain sizable and significant (for news about perpetrated felonies) for 
16-year-old offenders, while they are not for 15-year-olds.	 These results are more 
imprecise, and the differences between the effects on prison sentences at 16 and 15 
years old is not significant. Because cases are similar, and the main difference is the 
presence or absence of juries of laypeople, this suggests that professional knowledge 
of and experience with the legal or criminal justice system protects against media 
biases.  
The full distribution of the effect broken out by age at infraction is presented in figure 
6. While the estimates are noisy because of the small sample sizes, the general picture 
is similar to the one presented in columns 3–6 of table 8. Media coverage of crime 
does not affect sentences for offenders who were younger than 16 when offending, 
and so tried only by professional judges. Point estimates for prison sentences 
(excluding suspended sentences) are especially small. Conversely, the effect of media 
is significant or close to significant for offenders aged 16 or more. 
Lastly, we compare outcomes for first instance proceeding and appellate court 
separately. Procedural rules are slightly different in the two contexts. There are more 
jury members (9 in first instance proceedings, 12 in appellate court at that time of this 
study). Appellate courts judge crimes that were not committed in the county. Judges 
and attorneys working in appellate courts are usually more experienced than those in 
first instance courts. Lastly, appellate court cases have already been judged and so 
juries already have a reference point regarding sentences.  
Results presented in table E2 indicate that news stories on crimes have no effect on 
sentence decisions in appeal courts. This could be due to more careful deliberations 
for appellate decisions; to the existence of a reference point provided by the preceding 
decision; or to the presence of more experienced professionals, who can guide jurors 
more effectively to ignore the news.  
Overall, these three sets of results suggest that the effects of media on sentences are 
not present when there are professional judges, or when these are more experienced. 
While we cannot rule out fully that these differences in media effects are due to 
differences in case contents, or in the probability that one member of the court has 
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seen the news,37 these results over different contexts suggest that this null effect being 
driven by experience in the legal profession. 	
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we show that news content affects criminal justice decisions: sentences 
in jury trials are longer following more coverage of crime, and shorter after coverage 
of judicial errors. We find that only media coverage of crime and criminal justice (not 
of other upsetting topics) affects sentences, and that only coverage of crimes on the 
day before a sentence is handed down (not on other days) affects sentencing 
decisions. By contrast, we find no effect of media on professional judges’ sentencing 
decisions.  
Our results are important from a policy perspective. Understanding biases in judicial 
decisions is crucial, since the right to a fair trial is an essential feature of democratic 
justice systems. Our main result that sentences, but not convictions, are affected by 
media is in line with the finding in Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998) of 
“shared outrage but erratic awards” in punitive damages. Understanding differences 
between decision-making by judges and by lay people is important, as jury trials are 
costly and there are debates as to what jurisdictions they should be present in. 
Recent papers have identified several biases that judges might be subject to, such as 
mental depletion (Danziger et al, 2011), gambler’s fallacy (Chen et al, 2014), or mood 
of the day (Chen, 2014). Our paper suggests that professional expertise can limit the 
effect of media biases, which otherwise have been shown to matter for many 
behaviors (and in our case, for juries that include laypeople). This could be a reason 
for the French judicial system to include laypeople only in conviction decisions, and 
not in sentencing decisions, if these are more susceptible to external factors. 
The diffusion of this result during juror training could be a good way to reduce the 
problem; however, we should be mindful of the potential tradeoff of a “boomerang 
effect”: drawing jurors’ attention to potential biases may increase sensitivity to 
coverage of crime and justice. Overall, these results indicate that juries of lay people 																																																								
37 In criminal courts, the court is composed of 12 people; but only of three people in juvenile and in 
correctional courts. It may also be the case that judges are less likely to watch the 8PM news.  
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might lead to greater noise in outcomes of trials, if, beyond behavioral biases, the 
current-events context also impacts sentencing.  
By investigating the effect of media on sentencing in a jury trial, we are able to look 
at a particularly localized, contextual outcome. For behaviors like voting, citizens 
might be actively looking for information in the media. Conversely, elected judges 
might be looking to influence the media through their decisions. Jurors, on the other 
hand, are plausibly neither seeking feedback, nor trying to influence other outcomes 
beyond the trial in which they are serving. Yet even in this setting, we find that media 
affects jurors’ decisions, underscoring the contextual influences of media.  
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Figure 1: Number of stories about perpetrated felonies on the 8PM national television 
news (TF1 and France 2) per week, from 2004 to 2010. Stories about perpetrated felonies 
are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: authors’ 
calculations based on data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Crimes on TV and reported by the police. The full line (left axis) presents the 
number of stories on perpetrated felonies on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and 
France 2), per month, from 2004 to 2010. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about 
crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. The dashed line (right axis) presents the 
number of felonies recorded by the police, per month, from 2004 to 2010. Source: 
authors’ calculations based on data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute, and 
from police statistics publicly available on the open data platform of the French 
government.  
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Figure 3 : Distribution of sentence length by coverage of crime on TV. The dark line 
(light line) presents the cumulative fraction of defendants with a sentence shorter than 
any sentence length, if there were any stories (no stories) on perpetrated felonies on the 
8PM national television news (TF1 and France 2) on the day before the verdict. Stories 
on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on criminal records provided by the French Ministry 
of Justice and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French 
criminal records.  
 
 
Figure 4: Duration of the effect of media coverage of crime on sentences: regression 
coefficients for perpetrated felonies, 7 days pre and post sentencing. The measure for 
perpetrated felonies is a dummy equal to one if there were any news stories about crimes 
on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and France 2). Stories on perpetrated felonies 
are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Note: the reported 
coefficients are for a single regression, which also includes controls for age, gender, 
nationality (dummy for French citizenship), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, 
number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of 
first instance), county, length of time between offense and trial, and dummies for month, 
day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Bars represent the 
95% confidence interval. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, 
provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
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Figure 5: Duration of the effect of media coverage of crime on “feeling unsafe”: 
regression coefficients for perpetrated felonies, 7 days before to 7 days after a survey of 
perceived insecurity. The measure for perpetrated felonies is a dummy equal to one if 
there were any news stories about crimes on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and 
France 2). Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention 
trials or legislation. The outcome is the answer to the question “do you feel insecure in 
your neighborhood,” on a scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always). Coefficients are for a single 
ordered logit regression, which includes controls for day of the week and region. Bars 
represent the 90% confidence interval. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from a 
survey on victimization conducted by the French National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE) and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute.  
 
Figure 6: Effect of the coverage of perpetrated felonies on sentencing, by age of the 
defendant and presence of lay jurors. This figure presents the coefficient of news on 
perpetrated felonies on two outcomes: sentence length, including suspended sentences 
(full line) and incarceration length (dotted line). We consider all youth judged both in 
juvenile court and criminal court, who were no more than 21 years old when they 
committed the offense. The measure for perpetrated felonies is a dummy equal to one if 
there were any news stories about perpetrated felonies on the 8PM national television 
news (TF1 and France 2). Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do 
not mention trials or legislation. The dashed line presents the fraction of trials judged by a 
jury (right axis). Note: each coefficient is for a separate regression, which also includes 
controls for sociodemographic and crime characteristic. Bars represent the 90% 
confidence interval. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by 
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the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute 
and from French criminal records.  
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		 		 Mean	 Standard	Deviation	 Median	 Maximum	
Fe
lo
ni
es
	(N
=1
6,
34
2)
	
Number	of	cases	per	year		 2335	 246	 2471	 2633	
Fraction	male	 .94	 .23	 1	 1	
Age	 38.62	 13.07	 37	 91	
Fraction	French	 .87	 .34	 1	 1	
Had	a	past	conviction		 .36	 .48	 0	 1	
Appellate	case		 .13	 .34	 0	 1	
Investigation	length	(year)	 5.29	 4.73	 3.49	 37.29	
Length	pre-trial	custody	(days)	 675.58	 491.4	 700	 7439	
Offense	 		 		 		 		
Murder	 .18	 .38	 0	 1	
Aggravated	assault	 .12	 .33	 0	 1	
Forcible	rape	 .47	 .5	 0	 1	
Property	crime	 .22	 .41	 0	 1	
Prison	sentence,	in	years	 		 	 	 		
Overall	 10.16	 5.68	 9	 life	
Murder	 15.15	 7.06	 15	 life	
Aggravated	assault	 8.91	 5.46	 8	 life	
Forcible	rape	 9.49	 4.38	 9	 life	
Property	crime	 8.25	 4.66	 7	 life	
Sub-sample	with	
acquittal	data	
(N=6,769)	
Felony	acquital	 .076	 .27	 0	 1	
8P
M
	T
V	
na
tio
na
l	n
ew
s	(
TF
1	
an
d	
Fr
an
ce
	2
)	
	(N
=2
,5
57
)	
Number	of	stories	per	day	on...	 	 	 	 		
Felonies	 1.28	 1.65	 1	 12	
Felony	perpetrated	 0.89	 1.37	 0	 10	
Judicial	errors	 0.14	 0.76	 0	 22	
At	least	one	story	per	day	on…	 	 	 	 		Felonies		 0.57	 0.50	 1	 1	
Felony	perpetrated		 0.45	 0.50	 0	 1	
Judicial	errors	 0.07	 0.26	 0	 1	
Time	per	day	(in	minutes)	on…	 	 	 	 		Felonies		 1.72	 2.34	 .95	 16.87	
Felony	perpetrated		 1.21	 1.96	 0	 13.08	
Judicial	errors	 0.22	 1.36	 0	 44.7	
Audience	(million)	 13	 2,13	 13	 19	
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on convictions and 8PM news content, 2004-2010. Statistics on 
the news content reflect stories covered on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and France 
2). Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. The summary statistics on convictions use all criminal records. The acquittal rate 
is calculated for the sub-sample of cases for which we have acquittal information. Source: 
Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, 
and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
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    Type of offense being tried  Trial characteristics 
  
  
  
  
Socio-demographics  
  
      Homicide 
Sexual 
assault Property 
Investigation 
length 
Pre-trial 
custody 
Appeal  
court 
Trial  
length 
Past 
conviction Age Male French 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
N
um
be
r o
f n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
Perpetrated  -0.000790 -0.000365 0.00388 -0.151 2.309 0.00296 0.0442 -0.000228 -0.169* 0.000185 0.00321 
 felonies t-1 (0.00335) (0.00413) (0.00394) (10.67) (3.093) (0.00208) (0.0297) (0.00309) (0.0922) (0.00144) (0.00213) 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felonies t-1 -0.00170 -0.000225 0.00255 16.94* 2.518 0.00150 0.0138 0.000891 -0.0428 -0.000216 0.00227 
  (0.00310) (0.00324) (0.00330) (9.910) (2.777) (0.00190) (0.0208) (0.00227) (0.0713) (0.00111) (0.00188) 
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial  -0.00745 -0.000837 0.00720 -4.851 -4.416 -0.00745* -0.0492 0.00184 -0.0981 0.00478*** 0.00538 
 errors t-1 (0.00454) (0.00547) (0.00532) (17.36) (5.663) (0.00417) (0.0460) (0.00460) (0.138) (0.00149) (0.00365) 
  Observations 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 7,324 
  Mean 0.300 0.469 0.216 1930 38.62 0.943 0.870 0.358 675.6 0.135 3.556 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of cases being tried, by media coverage on the day before the verdict. The dependent variable of each regression is specified in the 
column header. Panel A presents results by coverage of perpetrated felonies; panel B of felonies; panel C of judicial errors. We regress case characteristics on 
the number of news stories on each topic. Regressions include day of the week fixed effects. Each cell presents regression coefficients for a different 
regression. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes 
that do not mention trials or legislation. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.	Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by 
the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. 
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Outcome: 
 
Acquittal (sub-sample) Sentence length 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
N
um
be
r o
f n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
 Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated  0.00358 0.00281 
 
0.00245 28.28** 25.96** 
 
25.82** 
 felonies t-1 (0.00324) (0.00287) 
 
(0.00280) (14.06) (10.28) 
 
(9.992) 
Perpetrated  
  
0.00228 0.00187 
  
4.615 0.770 
 felonies t+1 
  
(0.00346) (0.00344) 
  
(10.08) (9.885) 
pval diff t-1/t+1       0.900       0.0651 
 Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 0.00471** 0.00382* 
 
0.00363* 33.25*** 25.25*** 
 
23.94*** 
  (0.00213) (0.00187) 
 
(0.00188) (12.53) (7.947) 
 
(7.760) 
Felony t+1 
  
0.00161 0.000953 
  
11.03 6.833 
  
  
(0.00277) (0.00282) 
  
(8.315) (8.199) 
Pval diff t-1/t+1       0.473       0.128 
 Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial errors t-1 0.000224 -0.00181 
 
-0.00274 -63.77*** -39.27** 
 
-39.70** 
  (0.00470) (0.00540) 
 
(0.00603) (21.96) (15.87) 
 
(15.77) 
Judicial errors t+1 
  
0.00578 0.00601 
  
-0.436 3.346 
  
  
(0.00747) (0.00777) 
  
(13.60) (13.34) 
Pval diff t-1/t+1       0.488       0.0395 
    
   
  
   
  
  Controls 
Day of 
week All All All 
Day of 
week All All All 
  Observations 6,769 6,719 6,719 6,719 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 
  Mean 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 3656 3656 3656 3656 
 
Table 3: News content, acquittals and sentence length: jury trials. Panel A presents the	effect	of coverage of perpetrated felonies; panel B of felonies; and panel C of judicial errors. Stories 
on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. The 
outcome in columns 1–4 is a dummy for acquittal. These regressions are estimated for the 
subsample of cases for which we have information on acquittals (defined in appendix A). 
Controls in columns 2–4 are for: gender, aggregate type of offense, county, dummies for 
month, day of week and year, which are the variables available for this sample. The outcome 
in columns 5–8 is sentence length in days. Regressions are estimated for all criminal records. 
Controls in 6–8 are for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), length of pre-trial 
detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of court 
(appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between offense and trial, 
dummies for month, day of week and year. News stories are those covered on the 8PM 
national television news on TF1 and France 2. All standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French 
Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from 
French criminal records. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Outcome:  Appeal 
log 
(sentence) Sentence length 
     
  
Without trial 
in county of 
the news 
Trial length 
longer than 1 
day 
With error 
clustered per 
day 
With session 
fixed effects 
With county 
specific time 
trend 
With media 
in minutes 
Same 
regression 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
N
um
be
r o
f n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies   
Perpetrated  -0.00153 0.00711*** 22.15** 34.61*** 25.82** 60.11*** 25.45** 18.45** 26.61*** 
 felonies t-1 (0.00221) (0.00262) (10.43) (12.20) (12.53) (19.97) (11.98) (8.410) (10.06) 
Perpetrated  -0.000649 -0.000490 7.792 21.50 0.770 23.47 -1.305 0.109 0.105 
 felonies t+1 (0.00208) (0.00278) (10.38) (14.03) (9.249) (17.06) (9.417) (6.597) (9.815) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.752 0.0502 0.320 0.472 0.113 0.110 0.0870 0.0969 0.0525 
Felony other than 
 
  
     
  20.12 
perpetrated t-1 
 
  
     
  (13.28) 
Felony other than  
 
  
     
  20.76 
perpetrated t+1 
 
  
     
  (14.57) 
pval diff t-1/t+1                 0.977 
 Panel B: effect of all news about felonies   
Felony t-1 -0.00189 0.00577** 22.92*** 38.27*** 23.94** 45.89*** 23.42** 15.54***   
  (0.00187) (0.00227) (8.355) (9.738) (9.413) (15.72) (9.114) (5.540)   
Felony t+1 0.00098 0.000739 9.702 7.195 6.833 24.68* 6.131 3.614   
  (0.00193) (0.00219) (8.528) (12.89) (7.562) (13.76) (7.563) (5.337)   
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.292 0.132 0.289 0.0854 0.174 0.249 0.170 0.105   
 Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors   
Judicial errors t-1 -0.00440 -0.0130** -40.09** -27.57 -39.70*** -24.18 -35.65*** -20.28** -41.87*** 
  (0.00403) (0.00530) (15.74) (25.01) (11.85) (41.26) (11.08) (8.947) (15.61) 
Judicial errors t+1 -0.00167 0.00322 2.985 9.884 3.346 16.49 4.394 0.852 3.605 
  (0.00230) (0.00383) (13.31) (22.26) (7.748) (36.18) (8.104) (6.850) (12.67) 
Pval diff t-1/t+1 0.592 0.0127 0.0389 0.357 0.00407 0.402 0.00566 0.0643 0.0296 
  Observations 16,636 16,340 (see note)  7,041 16,342 7,903 16,342 16,342 16,342 
  Mean 0.149 8.058 (see note)  3666 3656 3619 3656 3656 3656 
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Table 4: News content and sentence length: robustness checks. Panel A presents the effect of coverage of perpetrated felonies; panel B of coverage of 
felonies; and panel C of coverage of judicial errors. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. These 
estimates include controls for age, gender, nationality (French or other), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past 
five years, county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. In all columns except for column 1, we also control 
for type of court (appellate court, court of first instance). In all but column 5, standard errors are clustered at the county level. In column 1, the sample 
includes all first instance trials between 2004 and 2010, and no appellate trials. In column 1, we look at the effect of media on the day before the first instance 
verdict, and not on the final conviction. In column 3, we exclude stories that took place within the same county as the trial, and so the sample size and 
outcome mean varies across panels. Panel A has 15,956 observations (mean sentence: 3,658 days); panel B has 15,856 observations (mean sentence: 3,655 
days); and panel C has16,331 observations (mean sentence: 3,655 days). In column 4 and 5, we only include data for which we have information on session 
length (subsample 1, as defined in online appendix A). In column 4, we exclude from that sample cases where the trial lasted one day. News stories are those 
covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry 
of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Outcome: Sentence length Survey: felt 
unsafe in 
your 
neighborhood      
Controlling 
crimes 
(police) 
Controlling 
crimes 
(courts) 
Audience 
below 
median 
Audience 
above 
median 
Trial 
length ≥2 days  Intensive & extensive margin 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated 
felony t-1 86.10***     
 
    76.76**   
(dummy)  (24.33)     
 
    (35.29)   
Perpetrated  
felony t+1 10.81     
 
    15.97   
 (dummy)  (28.28)     
 
    (35.34)   
Perpetrated  
 
    
 
  -1.374     
 felonies t-2 
 
    
 
  (16.56)     
Perpetrated  
 
25.60** 24.90** 19.09 27.86* 32.21** 5.177 0.0210** 
 felonies t-1 
 
(10.09) (10.08) (16.27) (14.75) (13.99) (14.58) (0.0103) 
Perpetrated  
 
0.955 2.111 -1.836 1.317 18.72 -3.048 -0.00366 
 felonies t+1 
 
(9.762) (9.814) (13.36) (13.71) (14.56) (12.59) (0.00833) 
Crimes – Police  
 
-3.137*   
 
        
 measure 
 
(1.599)   
 
        
Crimes – Court  
 
  0.321 
 
        
 measure 
 
  (38.15) 
 
        
Pval t-1/t+1 
(dummy) 0.0584     
 
    0.254   
Pval t-1/t+1 
(continuous) 
 
0.0694 0.0757 0.339 0.158 0.461 0.656 0.0845 
Pval t-1 audience       0.681       
 Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 91.86***     
 
    67.55*   
 (dummy)  (25.76)     
 
    (37.87)   
Felony t+1 28.82     
 
    17.19   
 (dummy)  (25.52)     
 
    (36.12)   
Felony t-2 
 
    
 
  -18.60     
  
 
    
 
  (12.40)     
Felonies t-1 
 
23.89*** 24.28*** 17.21 26.26** 38.92*** 11.01 0.00186 
  
 
(7.737) (7.575) (12.02) (11.12) (10.69) (11.57) (0.00747) 
Felonies t+1 
 
6.954 7.766 0.306 15.29 13.76 3.985 -0.00363 
  
 
(8.131) (7.895) (12.97) (11.08) (12.36) (11.45) (0.00711) 
Crimes – Police  
 
-3.169*   
 
        
 measure 
 
(1.614)   
 
        
Crimes – Court  
 
  -0.156 
 
        
 measure 
 
  (37.94) 
 
        
Pval t-1/t+1 
(dummy) 0.0791     
 
    0.336   
Pval t-1/t+1 
(continuous) 
 
0.129 0.110 0.373 0.485 0.162 0.669 0.637 
Pval t-1 audience       0.579       
Observations 16,342 16,342 15,926 7,378 8,041 6,462 16,342 50,749 
Mean 3656 3656 3656 3585 3587 3654 3656 1.383 
 
Table 5: Evidence on mechanisms and heterogeneity of effects. Panel A presents the effect of 
coverage of perpetrated felonies; and panel B of felonies. Stories on perpetrated felonies are 
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stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. In column 1, we include a 
dummy for the presence of news stories on crimes. In column 2, we include controls for the 
number of felonies per county and per month, measured using publicly available police data. 
In column 3, we include controls for the number crimes per county and per day that led to a 
conviction by 2015, as reflected in criminal records. We calculate this using the date of 
conviction that appears on criminal records. We exclude cases tried on the first day of each 
month, since in criminal records, crimes are dated on the first day of the month if the exact 
date is unknown. In column 4 (5), we limit our sample to cases tried on a day where the 
audience for the 8PM news was below (above) the median in audiences for that period. In 
column 6, we only include data for which we have information on session length (subsample 
1, as defined in online appendix A), and for which the trial lasted 2 days or more. In column 
7, we include a dummy for the presence of news stories on crimes; and the number of news 
stories on crimes. Estimates in columns 1–7 include controls for age, gender, nationality 
(French or other), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in 
the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of 
time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors in 
columns 1-7 are clustered at the county level. Estimates in column 8 are calculated for 
responses to a survey on perceived safety. The outcome is the answer to the question “do you 
feel insecure in your neighborhood?” on a scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always). Estimates in 
column 8 include controls for day of the week and region. News stories are those covered on 
the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Source: Authors’ calculations based 
on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the 
National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records, from publically available 
police statistics, and from a survey on victimization, conducted by the French National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Outcome:   Sentence length 
    All trials Murder Aggravated assault 
Sexual 
crimes 
Property 
crimes 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
Perpetrated    25.82** 30.37 -32.52 27.99** 57.64** 
 felonies t-1   (9.992) (37.72) (37.84) (13.41) (24.22) 
Perpetrated    0.770 6.638 9.781 -7.337 10.19 
 felonies t+1   (9.885) (33.72) (26.57) (12.65) (24.07) 
Pval diff t-1/t+1   0.0651 0.559 0.369 0.0649 0.258 
  Panel B: effect of news about perpetrated felonies, by type of crime covered 
Number of news 
stories on 
perpetrated 
felonies at t-1 
on… 
Murder 14.71 -39.70 -89.97** 41.07** 72.63* 
  (13.63) (40.72) (41.99) (19.43) (43.65) 
Sexual  56.24* 129.2 166.5** 10.70 27.62 
 crimes (32.64) (107.2) (82.30) (34.27) (54.88) 
Other 21.90 97.44 -74.92 15.71 42.56 
  (16.85) (63.17) (64.10) (22.22) (29.75) 
 
Number of news  
stories on 
perpetrated 
felonies at t+1 
on… 
 
 
Murder -16.93 -20.33 -5.223 -23.68* -10.65 
  (14.03) (42.30) (32.73) (13.26) (39.45) 
Sexual  21.53 116.3 -20.54 15.93 12.53 
 crimes (23.24) (85.96) (74.86) (29.95) (52.45) 
Other 18.62 -0.639 71.87 0.130 36.77 
  (20.47) (82.21) (59.37) (23.02) (31.48) 
              
Observations   16,342 2,913 1,983 7,661 3,529 
Mean   3656 5455 3209 3416 2968 
 
Table 6: Heterogeneity of the effect of media on sentences, by type of crime covered on TV 
and by type of offense being tried. The outcome in all regressions is sentence length in days. 
Panel A presents the	 effect	 of coverage of perpetrated felonies; and panel B of felonies. 
Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. These estimates are calculated using all criminal records, and include controls for 
age, gender, nationality (French or other), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, 
number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first 
instance), county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week 
and year. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and 
France 2. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. 
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 Sample 
Corrections courts 
(professional judges only) Juveniles 
All severe 
misdemeanors  
Severe sexual 
misdemeanors 
Felonies in 
juvenile court 
(no jurors) 
Juveniles in 
criminal 
court (jurors) 
Diff col. (3) 
and col. (4): 
P-value 
15 years 
old (no 
jurors) 
16 years 
old 
(jurors) 
Diff col. (6) 
and col. (7): 
P-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Number of cases per year 5,051 2,977 316 263  85 121  
Male .92 .95 .97 .97 .09 .96 .97 .17 
French .84 .85 .97 .94 0 .96 .95 .38 
Age (at crime) 35.48 39.6 13.98 17.01 0 15 16 0 
Investigation length 
(days) 1129 1645 1851 1752 .04 1426 2005 0 
Sentence (including 
suspended) 596 679 800 2068 0 978 1809 0 
Sentence in prison  290 317 170 1478 0 331 1141 0 
Murder & violence .41 0 .05 .17 0 .09 .13 .013 
Sexual assaults .59 1 .82 .53 0 .7 .69 .72 
Armed robbery 0 0 .12 .3 0 .21 .18 .11 
N 35,358 20,842 2,212 1,842   594 845   
 
Table 7: Jurors vs. professional judges: descriptive statistics on corrections courts and on felonies judged in juvenile court or in juvenile criminal court. We 
define “severe misdemeanors” as crimes for which the maximum sentence in the French Criminal Code is at least seven years. We define “severe sexual 
misdemeanors” as sexual offenses for which the maximum sentence in the French Criminal Code is at least seven years. 
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Outcome:  Sentence length 
 Sample 
Corrections courts 
(professional judges only) Juveniles 
All severe 
misdemeanor 
Severe 
sexual 
misdemeanor 
Felonies in 
juvenile 
court (no 
jurors) 
Juveniles in 
criminal 
court 
(jurors) 
15 years old 
(no jurors) 
16 years old 
(jurors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
on sentences (including suspended) 
Perpetrated felony t-1 1.534 -2.532 34.75 146.9** 68.18 107.9* 
(dummy)  (4.814) (6.085) (28.69) (69.40) (64.04) (63.80) 
Perpetrated felony t+1 2.643 2.162 -20.57 -24.76 -94.51* -120.4 
(dummy)  (4.509) (6.243) (26.14) (94.41) (53.60) (76.22) 
  
 
  
  
    
Pval t-1/t+1 0.880 0.588 0.167 0.172 0.0878 0.0397 
Pval comparison t-1 
 
  0.061 0.596 
Mean Sentence 
(including suspended) 595.8 679 800 2068 979.7 1799 
 
Panel B: effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
on sentence in prison 
Felony t-1 0.883 -0.810 10.58 165.8* 12.90 69.73 
(dummy)  (3.657) (5.000) (18.23) (94.45) (60.23) (81.74) 
Felony t+1 -2.592 -7.597 20.33 -22.12 -78.73 -47.16 
(dummy)  (3.445) (4.669) (20.79) (125.4) (56.30) (97.18) 
  
 
  
  
    
Pval t-1/t+1 0.511 0.331 0.342 0.269 0.361 0.395 
Pval comparison t-1 
 
  0.0802 0.603 
  
 
  
  
    
Observations 35,358 20,842 2,212 1,842 594 845 
Mean sentence in prison 290.3 316.8 170.4 1478 331.3 1141 
 
Table 8: Effects of media, depending on the presence of juries of laypeople: corrections 
courts and juveniles. The outcome in all regressions is sentence length in days. In panel A, the 
outcome is sentence length (including suspended sentences). In panel B, the outcome is the 
imprisonment sentence. We include controls for day of week. We define “severe 
misdemeanors” as crimes for which the maximum sentence in the French Criminal Code is at 
least seven years. We define “severe sexual misdemeanors” as sexual aggressions for which 
the maximum sentence in the French Criminal Code is at least seven years. News stories are 
those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on 
perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix: Keywords Used in Our Definitions of Crimes and Criminal Justice 
Stories 
 
Table A1 shows an example of what the raw media data looks like. For each story on 
the 8PM news, the National Audiovisual Institute provides its title, length, time of 
broadcast, and a list of keywords associated with that story. We use this these 
keywords to determine what stories cover crime and judicial errors.  
 
Title Channel Length Keywords Day Time 
[Barack Obama 
elected president 
of the United 
States] 
TF1 00:02:19 
Presidential election; United States; Obama 
Barack; Democratic Party - United States; 
domestic policy; election results 
05/11/08 08:01:15 
[A family murder 
in Hendaye] TF1 00:01:25 
confessions; child; family; wife; resident 
(neighbor); Hendaye; murder; Father; 
Pyrenees Atlantiques; testimony 
16/02/04 08:12:22 
[Meeting between 
Dominique Perben 
and the Outreau 
acquitted] 
TF1 00:01:22 
acquittal; judicial error; compensation; 
Outreau; pedophilia; judicial rehabilitation; 
meeting 
27/09/04 08:00:54 
Table A1: example of the structure of raw media data, for three different news stories. 
Below is the list of words that we used to define the aggregate measures of media 
coverage of crime and criminal justice, with number of days that these words appear 
in parentheses.  
 
1. Crime: enfant (Mathias) (20); Mouzin Estelle (26); Evrard Francis (26); crime 
(sexuel) (26); enfant (Valentin) (28); enfant (Jonathan) (31); enfant (Antoine) 
(36); bandit (39); inceste (40); Bodein Pierre (41); Fourniret Michel (44); 
cadavre (48); Louis Emile (50); gang (Gang des barbares) (57); crime (68); 
infanticide (76); bagarre (89) (if used with " décès "); prise d'otage (93); 
Treiber Jean Pierre (96); séquestration (98); Giraud Géraldine (99); banditisme 
(113); Erignac Claude (113); Colonna Yvan (117); meurtrier (127); assassinat 
politique (134); fusillade (162); hold-up (200); viol (321); moeurs (334); 
enlèvement (335); pédophilie (522); meurtre (1435); violence (1620) (if used 
with the word death). 
 
2. Judicial errors: erreur judiciaire (235); Outreau (262); réhabilitation 
judiciaire (36); Burgaud Fabrice (58). 
 
3. Trial: reconstitution judiciaire (20); audience-procès (21); réquisition (29); 
conseil d'Etat (29); procédure d'appel (31); justice (recours) (35); Cour de 
cassation (37); palais de justice (38); accuse (39); non lieu (39); tribunal de 
grande instance (49); relaxe (58); acquittement (100); cour d'appel (112); 
tribunal correctionnel (123); tribunal (128); verdict (300); cour d'assises (372); 
prison (402); procès (2173) 
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4. Law: projet de loi (anticipation et prévention des conflits) (22); parlementaire 
(24); gouvernement (Fillon, 4eme) (24); gouvernement (Fillon, 2eme) (26); 
parlement (28); gouvernement (Fillon, 3eme) (28); projet de loi (cohésion 
sociale) (33); loi (relatif aux libertés des universités) (44); amendement (63); 
débat parlementaire (66); gouvernement (Fillon) (66); droit pénal (91); député 
(93); sénat (114); Assemblée nationale (401); loi (599); projet de loi (1032). 
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Online Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Court Data 
We use three different datasets to capture criminal justice outcomes. Table A1 
summarizes the content in each dataset, and table A2 presents descriptive statistics for 
each sample.  
 
Our main dataset, referred to here as “full sample,” is an administrative dataset 
containing all convictions that occurred in France between 2004 and 2010. The 
French Ministry of Justice compiles this database to check defendants’ criminal 
records. There is one observation per conviction, which includes offenses, sentence, 
verdict date, procedural characteristics (first instance or appellate trial), and socio-
demographic information. However, this dataset only contains information on final 
convictions: criminal records contain no mention of acquittals, or of first instance 
decisions when decisions are appealed. Another limitation is that this dataset only 
contains information on conviction date, and not on trial length.  
 
In order to measure the effect of media on acquittals, and to exploit variations in trial 
length, we contacted all 95 French courts (there is one court per county) to ask for 
their trial schedules and all trial outcomes. 42 courts responded, some of which had 
information available for only certain years. Out of these, 17 provided only their 
schedules, and 25 sent us both their schedules and trial outcomes. We can thus 
construct 2 subsamples: 
 
• Subsample 1 contains the start and finish dates for each trial, and covers 42 
counties. This is the sample that we use to look at the effect of media when a 
trial lasts more than a day (table 4, columns 4 and 6; table 5, column 6). 
• Subsample 2 contains information on trial start and finish time; as well as 
information on all trial outcomes – conviction or acquittal – for both final 
decisions and appealed decisions. We refer to trials that led to an appeal as 
“first instance proceedings.” We use this subsample to look at conviction 
outcomes (table 3, columns 1 through 4). Note that for cases that led to an 
acquittal, we do not have a person’s full criminal record, and in particular we 
do not have information on a person’s age, nationality, past offenses, or length 
of pre-trial detention. We have information only on a person’s gender and 
current offense.  
 
Table A1 summarizes the characteristics of each of the datasets.  
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  Full sample Subsample 1 Subsample 2 
Number of counties 95 42 25 
Number of cases 16,342 7,903 4,330 
Cases for which this 
data is available Only for final convictions Only for final convictions 
All trials, including first 
instances and acquittals 
Variables  
• Offense and past 
convictions 
• Pre-trial detention 
• Sociodemographic  
• Conviction date 
All in sample A + 
Trial start and finish date 
For convictions: all in 
sample B + appeal  
For acquittals: acquittal 
date and place, offense, 
gender 
Table A1: Characteristics of the different criminal outcome datasets 
 
Table A2 presents the characteristics of defendants in these two subsamples, 
compared to the full sample. Overall, defendants are similar in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. One difference is in offenses – there are slightly more 
forcible rapes in subsample 2 than in the full sample (49% vs. 47%); and slightly 
fewer property crimes (19% vs. 22%). 
 
  Full sample Subsample 1 Subsample 2 
  Mean Mean Pval difference with full sample Mean 
Pval difference 
with full sample 
Male .94 .94 .74 .94 .7 
Age 38.62 38.2 .02 38.46 .47 
French .87 .84 0 .85 0 
Investigation length (year) 5.29 5.32 .56 5.29 .97 
Had a past conviction  .36 .36 .95 .35 .69 
Length pre-trial custody (days) 675.58 697.7 0 697.19 .01 
Offense         
Murder .18 .17 .25 .18 .86 
Violence .12 .13 .05 .12 .98 
Forcible rape .47 .46 .17 .49 .05 
Property crime .22 .22 .71 .19 0 
Prison sentence, in years         
Overall  10.16 10.05 .19 10.31 .12 
Murder  15.15 15.02 .57 15.57 .15 
Violence  8.91 8.96 .82 8.72 .46 
Forcible rape  9.49 9.49 .98 9.56 .52 
Property crime  8.25 8.05 .16 8.6 .06 
N 16,342 7,903   4,33   
 
Table A2: Characteristics of defendants in the subsamples, compared to the main 
dataset 
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List of counties in subsample 2:  
• Data available for all years: 1, 6, 31, 33, 36, 42, 44, 45, 49, 52, 54, 78, 80, 81, 
82, 86, 87, 91, 93 
• Data available for certain years: 85 (for 2005-2010), 66 (for 2004-2007), 73 
and 74 (for 2009-2010), 62 (for 2004-2005), 76 (for 2004) 
 
List of counties in subsample 1, on top of those in subsample 2:  
• Data available for all years: 3, 15, 27, 30, 34, 38, 43, 47, 57, 63, 94 
• Data available for certain years: 75 (for 2004-2006 and 2008-2010), 62 (for 
2006-2010), 77 (for 2005-2010), 25 (for 2007-2010), 67 for (2004-2006), 73 
and 95 (for 2009-2010), 59 (for 2010) 
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Appendix B: Additional Information on Identification Strategy 
 
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that news content is orthogonal to 
the timing of trials. While we show that the timing of trials cannot be gamed around 
the media context, another threat to identification would be if media reflected 
upcoming trials. To limit this risk that media covered these trials, we mainly focus on 
stories about perpetrated felonies, to avoid capturing information on the case being 
tried itself.  
 
However, as we mentioned in section 3.1., our identification assumption could still be 
violated if the number of news stories on felonies perpetrated were correlated with the 
number of news stories on trial for felony. This could be the case if media was more 
prone to cover crimes during high-profile trials, or if news stories about trials were to 
crowd out news stories about crimes committed. 
 
To further test our identification assumption, we regress the number of news stories 
on perpetrated crimes on the number of news stories on trials. Results are presented in 
table B1. We look at the number of news stories (column 1), the presence of news 
stories on crime (column 2) or more specifically on violent crime (column 3) or 
sexual crime (column 4). All coefficients are small and non-significant. Moreover, R2 
are extremely low, confirming that coverage of perpetrated crimes is not correlated 
with coverage on trials for crime the same day. 
 
We replicate this exercise for news about trials at t and news about perpetrated 
felonies at t-1. This allows us to test whether media anticipates important trials by 
presenting more stories on perpetrated felonies the day before. Results are presented 
in table B2. Once again, coefficients are small and non-significant, and the R2 are all 
very low. This all converges to suggest that news stories about perpetrated crimes are 
not correlated to news about trials. 
 
In several specifications, we include coverage of media at t-1 and at t+1, which has 
several advantages. First, this summarizes the main effect and the placebo. Second, 
this helps address the fact that news stories might be correlated over time: an event 
might be covered several days in a row, and media!!! could be correlated with Y!" 
through the correlation between media!!! and media!!!. Empirically, coverage of 
felonies and judicial errors on a given day increases the number of reports on that 
subject the following day by 0.32, and 0.43 respectively. However, the correlation is 
much weaker two days later, around 0.07; and there is no longer any correlation after 
this. This suggests that on average, events are covered for a couple of days. 
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    Stories on perpetrated crimes 
    
Number of 
stories, 
any crime 
Dummy for 
story on 
any crime  
Dummy for 
story on 
violence 
Dummy for 
story on sexual 
crime 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
St
or
ie
s o
n 
fe
lo
ny
 tr
ia
ls
 
Number of stories, 
any crime 0.0493       
  (0.0325) 
  
  
Dummy for story 
on any crime   -0.000705 
 
  
    (0.0279) 
 
  
Dummy for story 
on violence   
 
-0.0290   
   
 
(0.0244)   
Dummy for any 
story on sexual 
crimes   
  
0.00124 
 
  
  
(0.0227) 
      
  
  
Observations 2,557 2,557 2,557 2,557 
R2 0.000942 2.50e-07 0.000461 1.23e-06 
Table B1: correlation between news about perpetrated crimes and news about judicial 
decisions. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records. 
 
    Stories on perpetrated crimes at t-1 
    
Number of 
stories, 
any crime 
Dummy for 
story on 
any crime  
Dummy for 
story on 
murder 
Dummy for 
story on sexual 
crime 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
St
or
ie
s o
n 
fe
lo
ny
 tr
ia
ls
 a
t t
 
Number of stories, 
any crime 0.0448       
  (0.0341) 
  
  
Dummy for story 
on any crime   0.0264 
 
  
    (0.0239) 
 
  
Dummy for story 
on murder   
 
0.00123   
   
 
(0.0227)   
Dummy for any 
story on sexual 
crimes   
  
0.0320 
 
  
  
(0.0288) 
      
  
  
Observations 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556 
R2 0.000778 0.000479 1.22e-06 0.000562 
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Table B2: correlation between news about perpetrated crimes at t-1 and news about 
judicial decisions at t.	Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, 
provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1: Crimes on TV and reported by the police. The full line (left axis) presents 
the number of stories on perpetrated felonies on the 8PM national television news 
(TF1 and France 2), per year, from 2004 to 2010. Stories on perpetrated felonies are 
stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. The dashed line (right 
axis) presents the number of felonies recorded by the police, per year, from 2004 to 
2010. Source: authors’ calculations based on data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute, and from police statistics, publicly available on the open data 
platform of the French government.  
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Appendix C: Quantile Regression Results 
  
 
We use quantile regressions to explore the distribution of the treatment effect. The 
goal is to see whether media coverage of crime and judicial errors affects certain 
sentences more than others. Table C1 presents quantile regression estimates of the 
effect of media coverage of crime (columns 1 and 2) and judicial errors (columns 3 
and 4) on sentences, for each ventile of the sentence distribution. Odd columns are 
without controls, and even columns include controls for gender, offense, nationality, 
investigation length, time in pre-trial detention, and dummies for day of week.  
 
This table suggests that media coverage of crime affects sentences in the top two third 
of the distribution, while coverage of judicial errors affects sentences in the bottom 
half of the distribution. However, except for the top deciles of the treatment effect of 
news stories on crime, most of the quantile regression coefficients are not 
significantly different from one another when we include controls. Note also that all 
coefficients are of the same sign, for either type of news story. 
 
Note that in the quantile regressions without controls, many coefficients are exactly 
equal to zero (columns 1 and 3). This is due to the fact that sentences in criminal court 
are whole years, and they do not take many values (see figure 3 for an illustration of 
this). While there may be a difference across media contexts in the percent of people 
who are sentenced to a given number of years, the gap may open and close outside of 
a ventile; and in that case, it won’t be captured in these quantile regressions. 
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  Perpetrated felonies (dummy) Judicial errors (dummy) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quantile No control Controls No controls controls 
  (0) (23.99) (12.43) (42.93) 
10 0 27.6 0 -102.21*** 
  (0) (22.28) (0) (36.26) 
15 0 17.83 0 -100.47*** 
  (0) (22.04) (0) (36.05) 
20 0 23.99 0 -80.37** 
  (0) (21.76) (0) (36.49) 
25 0 31.01 -360*** -79.9** 
  (0) (22.03) (75.65) (35.68) 
30 360*** 36.34* -360*** -92.09*** 
  (42.9) (21.95) (70.33) (35.51) 
35 0 45.24* 0 -81.17* 
  (0) (25.5) (0) (42.91) 
40 0 49.42* 0 -86.79** 
  (0) (26.4) (0) (43.05) 
45 0 60.28** 0 -68.15 
  (0) (27.52) (0) (45.95) 
50 360*** 61.24** -360*** -72.11 
  (73.81) (27.43) (121) (46.39) 
55 0 54.91* 0 -58.48 
  (0) (28.48) (0) (46.36) 
60 0 55.54* 0 -57.31 
  (0) (30.35) (0) (49.32) 
65 720*** 56.53* -360*** -22.39 
  (80.68) (31.01) (132.27) (50.04) 
70 0 96.18*** 0 -12.99 
  (0) (36.61) (0) (59.03) 
75 360*** 110.2*** 0 -55.24 
  (67.31) (38.04) (0) (60.58) 
80 360*** 132.63*** -360** -21.55 
  (77.34) (44.23) (164.5) (73.54) 
85 0 153.95*** 0 -43.12 
  (0) (54.25) (0) (88.76) 
90 0 156.93** 0 -43.44 
  (0) (70.7) (0) (113.68) 
95 0 246.21*** 0 -153.17 
  (0) (88.51) (0) (138.21) 
 
Table C1: Quantile regression estimates for each ventile. Note: The outcome variable is 
sentence, in days. The number of observations is the same for each regression (16,342). 
Controls are for: gender, age, type of offense, nationality, investigation length, time in pre-
trial detention, dummies for day of week. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal 
records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.   
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Appendix D: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
 
In the first four columns of table 3, we showed that news about perpetrated felonies 
and judicial errors had no effect on acquittal, while news about felonies in general 
was correlated with lower acquittal rates. We test the robustness of those results by 
using different models (logit, probit, different clustering, county time trend, 
month*year fixed effects) and different measure of the news (dummies or time of the 
news). Results are presented in table D1. The null effect of news about perpetrated 
felonies and judicial errors on conviction is robust. The correlation between news 
stories on felonies in general and convictions is not robust across specifications. 
 
In table D2, we measure the effect of media on the number of convictions per day. 
This is another way to capture the potential effect of media on acquittals. Indeed, 
since the criminal records data only includes information conditional on conviction, if 
there are more (resp. fewer) acquittals, we should observe fewer (resp. more) 
convictions. We find this not to be the case.  
 
If coverage of crime were to affect acquittals, we would not be observing sentences 
for the same subsample of trials after coverage of crime or not. For example, if news 
on felonies increases the probability of being found guilty, we would observe more 
sentences after news coverage of felonies. Using simple OLS would lead to biased 
estimates. In the previous example, the marginal conviction would plausibly have 
shorter average sentences, if less severe cases are more likely to be swayed by media. 
Selection would thus induce a downward bias to our results. If media has no effect on 
acquittals, then the effect of media on sentences will not be biased. Results presented 
in tables 3, D1 and D2 do not support the hypothesis of an effect of media on 
acquittal. 
 
In table D3, we further explore how the acquittal and sentencing margins may 
interact, using data from subsample 2, for which information on acquittal is available. 
In column 1, we run our main regression with acquittals considered as sentence 
lengths of zero. In columns 2 and 3, we present the results when using a two stages 
Heckman selection model. The second stage (effect of media on sentences corrected 
for selection) is presented in column 2 and the first stage (probit estimates of the 
selection equation) in column 3. Results are similar to those presented in table 3: we 
find an effect of media on sentences (column 1 and 2) but not on acquittals (column 
3). 
 
In table D4, we replicate our main result – the effect of news on sentences (column 8 
of table 3) – removing life sentences and for the different subsamples presented in 
online appendix A. Column 1 reproduces column 8 of table 3. Column 2 removes life 
sentences instead of coding them as 32 years. Columns 3 and 4 present results for the 
two subsamples for which we gathered additional information. The sample sizes are 
smaller and our estimates tend to be less precise in these subsamples, but they are 
similar across specifications and not statistically different from one another. 
 
In table D5, we replicate our main result – the effect of news on sentences (column 8 
of table 3) – outside of electoral campaigns. These periods are usually characterized 
by high antagonism and special news coverage. In particular, crime and crime control 
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were major topics in the 2007 campaign. We use two definitions of the election 
period: the month before any election (column 1), which is the official “campaign 
period” in France, and January-June 2007, during which the presidential and 
legislative campaign de facto took place (column 2). Excluding these periods does not 
affect our main results. 
 
 
 
    Logit Probit Dummy Time (second) cluster day 
year*month 
fe 
dep time 
trend 
Same 
regression 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies    
Perpetrated 0.0283 0.0144 0.00284 3.36e-05 0.00245 0.00291 0.00240 0.00334 
felonies t-1 (0.0360) (0.0181) (0.00869) (2.51e-05) (0.00312) (0.00289) (0.00263) (0.00284) 
Perpetrated 0.0156 0.00439 -0.00459 5.75e-06 0.00187 -0.00142 0.00201 -0.00141 
 felonies t+1 (0.0395) (0.0210) (0.00774) (3.26e-05) (0.00299) (0.00305) (0.00403) (0.00311) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.827 0.742 0.546 0.507 0.901 0.384 0.937 0.342 
Felonies other than 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.00787* perpetrated t-1 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.00420) Felonies other than  	 	 	 	 	 	 -0.00527 perpetrated t+1        (0.00346) 
pval diff t-1/t+1             0.0490 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies   
Felony t-1 0.0470** 0.0239** 0.00713 2.94e-05 0.00363 0.00465* 0.00370*   
  (0.0231) (0.0119) (0.00810) (3.54e-05) (0.00252) (0.00234) (0.00184)   
Felony t+1 0.00395 -0.000673 -0.00594 1.79e-05 0.000953 -0.00256 0.00113   
  (0.0324) (0.0170) (0.00691) (3.70e-05) (0.00245) (0.00222) (0.00341)   
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.345 0.298 0.247 0.821 0.498 0.0557 0.546   
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors   
Judicial error t-1 -0.0388 -0.0203 -0.000506 -4.95e-06 -0.00274 -0.00531 -0.00192 -0.00573 
  (0.0798) (0.0397) (0.0125) (5.22e-05) (0.00517) (0.00468) (0.00590) (0.00435) 
Judicial error t+1 0.0649 0.0344 0.0159 5.52e-05 0.00601 0.00532 0.00600 0.00538 
  (0.0612) (0.0355) (0.0143) (6.87e-05) (0.00725) (0.00766) (0.00767) (0.00770) 
  pval diff t-1/t+1 0.405 0.412 0.453 0.578 0.378 0.361 0.523 0.326 
    	 	 	 	 	 	 	     Observations 6,539 6,539 6,719 6,719 6,719 6,719 6,719 6,719 
  Mean 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 0.0759 
Table D1: Robustness checks of the effect of media on acquittal. The outcome is a dummy for 
acquittal. These regressions are estimated for the subsample of cases for which we have 
information on acquittals (defined in appendix A). Controls are for: gender, type of offense, 
county, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 
2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. Felonies “other than perpetrated” are stories that jointly cover felonies and trials 
or legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the 
French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and 
from French criminal records.  
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 Outcome: Number of cases 
    (1) (2) (3) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
  Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated felonies t-1 0.00574 	 -0.00161   (0.0846) 	 (0.0859) Perpetrated felonies t+1 	 0.0335 0.0339   	 (0.0799) (0.0811) pval diff t-1/t+1     0.782 
 Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felonies t-1 0.0995 	 0.0859   (0.0727) 	 (0.0738) Felonies t+1 	 0.0821 0.0639   	 (0.0674) (0.0684) pval diff t-1/t+1     0.840 
 Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial errors t-1 0.228 	 0.205   (0.199) 	 (0.193) Judicial errors t+1 	 0.241* 0.220   	 (0.138) (0.135) pval diff t-1/t+1     0.952 
		 Observations 2,555 2,555 2,555 
		 Mean 6.909 6.909 6.909 
Table D2: Effect of media on the number of convictions per day. Regressions include controls 
for month, day of the week, and year.	Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal 
records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National 
Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records. 
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    Acquittal as a sentence of 0 years Heckman stage 2 Heckman stage 1 
    (1) (2) (3) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated 
felonies t-1 35.30** 41.65* -0.00964 
 (14.99) (22.17) (0.0186) 
Perpetrated 
felonies t+1 1.315 19.82 -0.0198 
 (29.90) (20.52) (0.0165) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.252 0.507 0.507 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 29.92*** 37.95** -0.0209 
 (10.39) (17.89) (0.0147) 
Felony t+1 0.442 5.984 -0.0116 
 (21.21) (16.77) (0.0135) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.201 0.235 0.235 
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial error t-1 -40.60 -81.19** -0.00737 
 (43.64) (35.89) (0.0287) 
Judicial error t+1 -37.13 6.930 -0.0337* 
 (32.66) (27.63) (0.0191) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.958 0.0713 0.0713 
		
	 	 	
  
		 Observations 6,333 6,333 6,333 
  Mean 3472 3736 3736 
Table D3: Robustness check: effect of media on sentences in subsamples 2 with acquittals 
considered as sentence length of zero (column 1) and Heckman selection model (columns 2 
and 3). The outcome variable is the sentence in days. Coefficients in each panel correspond to 
different estimates. The number of observations and sample means are the same within each 
column. In column 1, controls are for: gender, type of offense, county, dummies for month, 
day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. News stories are those 
covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated 
felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. For convergence 
reasons, controls are restricted to dummies for day of the week in column 2 and dummies for 
counties and day of the week in column 3. This analysis is run for the subsample of data for 
which we have information on acquittals (subsample 2, defined in online appendix A). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of 
Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal 
records. 
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    Full sample 
Full sample, 
minus life 
imprisonment 
Subsample 1 
(information 
on court dates) 
Subsample 2 
(information 
on acquittals) 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated felonies t-1 25.82** 23.04** 36.83*** 48.04** 
 (9.992) (9.324) (12.15) (18.18) 
Perpetrated felonies t+1 0.770 3.719 23.55* 28.01 
 (9.885) (9.711) (13.68) (17.43) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0651 0.140 0.445 0.268 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 23.94*** 20.94*** 36.97*** 36.65*** 
 (7.760) (7.619) (9.001) (11.79) 
Felony t+1 6.833 9.630 10.70 23.39 
 (8.199) (7.860) (12.76) (13.86) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.128 0.311 0.102 0.496 
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial error t-1 -39.70** -41.99*** -24.15 -36.43 
 (15.77) (15.52) (24.69) (36.84) 
Judicial error t+1 3.346 7.043 13.92 11.03 
 (13.34) (12.64) (18.19) (21.89) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0395  0.268 0.366 
		
	 	 	 	
  
		 Observations 16,342 16,223 7,903 4,33 
  Mean 3656 3598 3619 3710 
 
Table D4: Robustness check: effect of media on sentences for different subsamples. The 
outcome variable is the sentence in days. Controls are for: age, gender, nationality (French or 
other), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, county, number of prior convictions in 
the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), length of time 
between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. Subsamples in columns 3 and 4 are defined in online appendix 
A. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. 
Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French 
Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from 
French criminal records.  
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Outcome:  Sentence length 
    Without the month before election 
Without January-June 
2007 
    (1) (2) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
Perpetrated felonies t-1 26.85*** 22.68** 
 (9.800) (9.845) 
Perpetrated felonies t+1 -1.533 3.569 
 (10.27) (9.528) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0465 0.152 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 25.27*** 20.42** 
 (7.924) (7.987) 
Felony t+1 6.507 7.694 
 (8.935) (7.991) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.132 0.258 
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial error t-1 -37.36** -44.61*** 
 (16.38) (16.13) 
Judicial error t+1 -0.493 5.445 
 (14.57) (13.46) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0785 0.0178 
  
    
		 Observations 14,802 15,051 
		 Mean 3656 3656 
 
Table D5: Effect of news on sentences, excluding electoral periods. The outcome is the 
sentence length in days. Controls are for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), length of 
pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of 
court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between offense and 
trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 
2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French 
Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from 
French criminal records.  
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Appendix E: Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects 
 
 
In this appendix, we explore heterogeneities. First, we present the effect of different 
news stories on sentences. In table E1, the first four columns present the effect for 
“bad news” unrelated to criminal justice: strikes, natural disaster, social conflict, and 
unemployment. None of these news stories has an effect on sentences. The last two 
columns present the effect of the two most common keywords used in our main 
aggregates: “murder” in the felony aggregate and “judicial error” in the judicial error 
aggregate. Results are similar to the main regressions.  
 
Table E2 presents our main analyses for first instance proceeding and appellate court 
separately, which are discussed in section 6 of the paper. These results indicate that 
news stories on crimes have no effect on sentence decisions in appeal courts. This 
could be due to more careful deliberations for appellate decisions; to the existence of 
a reference point provided by the preceding decision; or to the presence of more 
experienced professionals, who can guide jurors more effectively to ignore the news. 
 
We then look for differential effects across defendant and county characteristics 
(tables E3 and E4). In table E3, we look at heterogeneous effects based on citizenship, 
age and past convictions of the defendant, interacting the variable of interest and 
controls with the characteristic of interest. In table E4, we look at heterogeneity across 
counties. We do not have information on jurors, but since they are randomly selected 
from their county’s electoral role, we can look at differences in counties. We measure 
the effect of news in counties where the share of conservative votes is higher than the 
national average, or the share of citizens older than 65 is larger than the national 
average. We find no significant differences. 
 
Turning to heterogeneity across news characteristics, we separately measure the effect 
of the content of the news on TF1 or France 2, the two channels for which we have 
data. As we mention in section 2.3., TF1 is a private channel and has an audience 
roughly 1.5 times larger than France 2, a public channel. Their coverage of crime and 
judicial errors is quantitatively very similar: 0.64 news stories on felony per day for 
TF1, the same for France 2; 0.068 news stories on judicial error per day for TF1, 
0.072 for France 2. In practice, there is a strong correlation in the content of news on 
either channel (0.5 for the number of news about crime; 0.7 for the number of news 
about judicial error). Results are presented in table E5. Coefficients are of the same 
order of magnitude and they are not significantly different. 
 
We then ask whether proximity of the news story matters. We divide the events into 
three groups: those that occurred in the same county as trial, in adjacent counties, or 
in other counties. Table E6 presents the percent of stories that take place in one’s 
county; in adjacent counties; or further out. Note that more than 90% of the news 
relate to events in other counties. Table E7 presents the effect of those news stories by 
proximity. The point estimates for news “outside county and adjacent counties” are 
significant and of the same order of magnitude as the effect of all news presented in 
table 3. The results observed in the paper do not come from events that occurred in 
the same county, or in close counties. Point estimates for events that took place in the 
same county, or in neighboring counties, are not significant; standard errors are very 
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large. Note that point estimates for the effect of news on perpetrated crimes are bigger 
when the event is closer. 
 
Lastly, in table E7, we present the effect of news placed in the beginning or in the end 
of the 8PM news lineup. The beginning is defined as the first 10 news stories (over 24 
on average). The effect of news stories about crimes broadcasted early on is always 
significant. This is not the case for news broadcasted towards the end. However, the 
differences between the two point estimates are not significant and the latter are 
sometimes bigger than the former (see columns 1 and 2). 
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Outcome  Sentence length 
Number of news 
stories on...  
Strikes 
Natural 
disasters 
Social 
conflict Unemployment Judicial errors Murder 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
   
  
 
  
… at t-1 4.951 -3.063 6.721 -17.73 -42.22** 28.70* 
  (5.743) (7.010) (7.406) (11.96) (18.03) (16.08) 
… at t+1 -1.714 8.370 -1.327 2.152 -0.918 -5.765 
  (6.302) (13.02) (7.185) (13.60) (14.67) (12.70) 
  
   
  
 
  
Controls yes yes Yes Yes yes Yes 
Obs 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 
Sample mean 3656 3656 3656 3656 3656 3656 	
Table E1: Sentence length and news: criminal justice versus other bad news. The outcome in 
all regressions is sentence length in days. These estimates are calculated using all criminal 
records, and include controls for age, gender, nationality (French or other), past convictions, 
length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five 
years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between 
offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at 
the county level.	News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 
and France 2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention 
trials or legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the 
French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and 
from French criminal records.  	 
 
 
 Outcome Sentence length 
  1st instance Appellate court 
 (1) (2) 
      
Perpetrated felonies t-1 30.22*** 6.975 
  (9.510) (36.64) 
Perpetrated felonies t+1 5.601 -28.01 
  (10.52) (30.21) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0551 0.532 
pval diff 1st/appeal t-1 0.506 
Felony t-1 27.72*** 0.361 
  (7.989) (23.95) 
Felony t+1 4.188 31.90 
  (8.342) (26.08) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0409 0.446 
pval diff 1st/appeal t-1 0.265 
  
	
  
Observations 14,139 2,203 
Mean 3476 4813 
 
Table E2: Effect of news stories on sentences in first instance court and appeals court. The 
outcome in all regressions is sentence length in days. These estimates are calculated using all 
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criminal records, and include controls for age, gender, nationality (French or other), past 
convictions, length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, county, number of prior convictions 
in the past five years, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of 
week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.	News stories are those 
covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated 
felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data 
collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  	 
 
 
 Outcome Sentence length 
 Interaction with non-French nationality Interaction with age 
Interaction with 
prior conviction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  	 	   Felony perpetrated t-1 21.93* 31.49** 17.54 
  (11.30) (13.35) (14.09) 
Felony perpetrated t+1 -0.0847 -2.215 0.443 
  (9.230) (13.37) (11.85) 
Felony perpetrated t-1 * not French 29.44 	     (33.74) 	   Felony perpetrated t+1 * not French 5.834 	     (25.52) 	   Felony perpetrated t-1 * age>median 	 -9.180     	 (19.51)   Felony perpetrated t+1 * age>median 	 8.176     	 (18.63)   Felony perpetrated t-1 * (prior conviction) 	 	 16.74   	 	 (20.56) Felony perpetrated t+1 * (prior conviction) 	 	 0.270   	 	 (17.63)   	 	   Observations 16,342 16,342 16,342 
Mean 3656 3656 3656 
Sd 2046 2046 2046 
Table E3: Effect of content of news on sentence length, by socio-demographic characteristics 
of the defendant. The outcome variable is the sentence in days. The median age of defendants 
is 37 years old. We include, on top of the main effects, the interaction of media coverage (and 
covariates) with nationality (column 1), a dummy for being over the median age (column 2), 
and a dummy for having a prior conviction (column 3). The controls are for: age, gender, 
nationality (French or), past convictions, length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number 
of prior convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first 
instance), county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week 
and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.	News stories are those covered on 
the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are 
stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations 
based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected 
from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
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 Outcome Sentence length 
  (1) (2) 
  	   Felony perpetrated t-1 26.49* 23.02* 
  (14.94) (13.85) 
Felony perpetrated t+1 -3.480 -1.117 
  (15.86) (14.78) 
Felony perpetrated t-1 * (population -1.449   
above 65 > national average) (20.62)   
Felony perpetrated t+1 * (population  9.024   
above 65> national average) (19.60)   
Felony perpetrated t-1 * (conservative vote > national  	 1.657  average) 	 (19.81) Felony perpetrated t+1 * (conservative vote > national  	 6.483  average) 	 (19.65)   	   Observations 16,342 16,342 
Mean 3656 3656 
Sd 2046 2046 
 
Table E4: Effect of content of news on sentence length, by average characteristics of the 
population in the county. The outcome variable is the sentence in days. Jurors are randomly 
drawn from the county's population (via electoral rolls). Past convictions are defined as 
having a prior conviction in one’s criminal record. Controls are for: age, gender, nationality 
(French or other), past convictions, length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of 
prior convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), 
county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. 
Additional controls for all the variables interacted with the relevant socio-demographic 
variable are also included. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.	News stories are 
those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on 
perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: 
Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, 
and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
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 Outcome: Sentence length 
    Using only the TF1 news stories 
Using only the France 2 
news stories  
    (1) (2) 
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s s
to
rie
s o
n…
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
Felony perpetrated t-1 39.59** 37.09** 
  (19.73) (15.41) 
Felony perpetrated t+1 0.495 5.448 
  (16.24) (18.28) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.125 0.160 
Panel B: effect of all news about felonies 
Felony t-1 41.58** 32.64** 
  (16.30) (13.06) 
Felony t+1 9.569 14.74 
  (14.86) (14.61) 
pval diff t-1/t+1 0.154 0.367 
Panel C: effect of news about judicial errors 
Judicial error t-1 -63.82** -72.53** 
  (26.68) (32.24) 
Judicial error t+1 9.176 2.586 
  (26.48) (25.54) 
  pval diff t-1/t+1 0.0564 0.0700 
    	     Control Yes Yes 
    	     Observations 16,342 16,342 
  Mean 3656 3656 
  Sd 2046 2046 
 
Table E5: Effect of news stories on sentences, by TV channel. Outcome is sentence length (in 
days). Controls are for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), past convictions, length of 
pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of 
court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between offense and 
trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level.	News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 
2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French 
Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from 
French criminal records.  
 
 
 
News that is… Proportion of news stories  about perpetrated crimes 
Proportion of all news stories 
about crimes 
… in the same county 2% 1% 
… in adjacent county 7% 4% 
… in other counties 91% 94% 
Table E6: Breakdown of news stories on crime, by distance to the court. Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice. 
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 Outcome:  Sentence length 
    
News about 
perpetrated 
crimes 
All news about crime 
    (1) (2) 
    
 
  
N
b 
of
 n
ew
s 
st
or
ie
s a
t t
-1
 
in
…
 
The same county 44.28 24.46 
  (42.02) (34.04) 
An adjacent county 35.27 38.21* 
  (32.99) (22.64) 
Neither county nor adjacent 22.89* 21.82** 
  (12.60) (9.886) 
    
 
  
  Observations 16,342 16,342 
  Mean 3656 3656 
  Sd 2046 2046 
Table E7: Effect of news stories on sentences, by distance between trial and place of the 
event. Outcome is sentence length (in days). Controls are for: age, gender, nationality (French 
or other), past convictions, length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior 
convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), 
county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.	News stories are those covered on the 8PM 
national television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories 
about crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the 
National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
 
 Outcome: sentence length in days 
 News stories on...  Perpetrated felonies All felonies 
Perpetrated 
felonies 
(dummy) 
All felonies 
(dummy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
   
  
Beginning t-1 21.23** 19.03** 76.73** 70.87** 
  (10.39) (9.003) (30.03) (28.79) 
End t-1 44.13 39.60* 58.78 38.57 
  (27.97) (20.10) (37.98) (27.51) 
Beginning t+1 -4.734 4.483 -20.62 -4.565 
  (11.08) (8.607) (31.66) (28.69) 
End t+1 27.60 21.84 23.94 22.75 
  (26.78) (21.40) (36.19) (33.39) 
  
   
  
Observations 16,342 16,342 16,342 16,342 
Mean 3656 3656 3656 3656 
P value for testing the null hypothesis 
of equality of the “beginning t-1” and 
“end t-1” coefficients 0.450 0.381 0.736 0.423 
 
Table E8: Effect of news stories about crime on sentences, by rank in the news lineup. Stories 
are defined as “at the beginning” (end) of the news lineup if they are in the first (second) half.  
Controls are for: age, gender, nationality (French or other), past convictions, length of pre-
trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of 
court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between offense and 
trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level.	News stories are those covered on the 8PM national television news on TF1 and France 
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2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about crimes that do not mention trials or 
legislation. Source: Authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French 
Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from 
French criminal records.  
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Appendix F: Additional Results on Judicial Error 
 
In this appendix, we present additional results on the effect of judicial errors on 
sentencing. Figure F1 shows that news on judicial errors are clustered in time, around 
events relating to the Outreau trial. In particular, there are spikes in news stories 
during first trial (May and June 2004), the appeal trial (November and December 
2005) and the review of the case by a parliamentary commission (January–April 
2006). 
 
Table F1 is analogous to table 5 in the paper, and looks at mechanisms. Results are 
overall similar to those in table 5: the effect of coverage of judicial error does not 
change when we control for crimes; point estimates are larger and more significant 
when there were above-median TV audiences. The main difference is that when we 
include both the presence and the number of stories on judicial errors, the number of 
judicial error stories matters more (column 7). 
 
Figure F2 is analogous to figure 3 in the paper. It plots the distribution of sentence 
length, by coverage of judicial errors on the 8PM national TV news on the day before 
a trial’s verdict. It seems that the difference in sentences after news about judicial 
errors appears for shorter sentences, while the difference in sentences after news 
about crime appears for longer sentences. This is confirmed in the quantile 
regressions, presented in appendix table C1 (columns 3 and 4).  
 
Lastly, figure F3 presents the coefficients for leads and lags for judicial errors 
(analogous to figure 4 in the paper). For judicial errors, the effect over time of news 
can be identified less cleanly, since coverage of judicial errors is more correlated over 
time. Indeed, news about judicial error mainly comes from the Outreau case, which in 
each iteration is covered multiple days in a row. It’s harder to identify clearly the 
dynamic of the effect when we add several leads and lag in the same regression.  
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Figure 1: Number of stories judicial errors on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and 
France 2) per week from 2004 to 2010. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about 
crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Source: authors’ calculations based on data 
collected from the National Audiovisual Institute.  
 	
	
Figure F2: Distribution of sentence length, by coverage of judicial errors on TV. The dark 
line (light line) presents the cumulative fraction of defendants with a sentence shorter than 
any sentence length, if there were any stories (no stories) on judicial errors on the 8PM 
national television news (TF1 and France 2) on the day before the verdict. Source: authors’ 
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calculations based on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data 
collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
 
 
 
Figure F3: Duration of the effect of media coverage of judicial errors: regression coefficients 
for perpetrated felonies, 7 days pre and post sentencing. The measure for judicial errors is a 
dummy equal to one if there were any news stories about judicial errors on the 8PM national 
television news (TF1 and France 2). Note: the reported coefficients are for a single regression, 
which also includes controls for age, gender, nationality (dummy for being French), length of 
pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of 
court (appellate court, court of first instance), county, length of time between offense and 
trial, and dummies for month, day of week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Source: authors’ calculations based 
on criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the 
National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records.  
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Outcome Sentence length 
    
Controlling 
crimes 
(police) 
Controlling 
crimes 
(courts) 
Audience 
below 
median 
Audience 
above 
median 
Trial length 
≥ 2days 
Intensive & 
extensive 
margin 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dummy: Judicial -72.06*     
 
    11.50 
error t-1 (41.36)     
 
    (53.52) 
Dummy: Judicial 23.52     
 
    23.56 
error t-1 (54.26)     
 
    (60.45) 
Judicial error t-2 
 
    
 
  1.126   
  
 
    
 
  (20.79)   
Judicial error t-1 
 
-40.73** -37.24** 15.42 -45.20** -24.54 -42.55** 
  
 
(15.82) (15.87) (44.55) (17.98) (31.95) (20.66) 
Judicial error t+1 
 
3.203 2.865 17.57 5.052 6.251 -0.677 
  
 
(13.28) (13.33) (28.98) (14.87) (22.11) (14.19) 
Crimes-Police 
 
-3.265**   
 
      
measure 
 
(1.598)   
 
      
Crimes-Court 
 
  -0.844 
 
      
measure 
 
  (37.93) 
 
      
Pval t-1/t+1 
(dummy) 0.137     
 
    0.882 
Pval t-1/t+1 
(continuous) 
 
0.0353 0.0516 0.972 0.0296 0.513 0.123 
pval t-1 audience       0.203     
Observations 16,342 16,342 15,926 7,378 8,041 6,462 16,342 
Mean 3656 3656 3656 3585 3587 3654 3656 
 
Table F1: Mechanisms: judicial errors. In column 1, we include controls for the number of 
felonies per county and per month, measured using publicly available police data. In column 
2, we include controls for the number crimes per county and per day that led to a conviction 
by 2015, as reflected on criminal records. We calculate this using the date of conviction that 
appears on criminal records. In column 4 (5), we limit our sample to cases tried on a day 
where the audience for the 8PM news was below (above) the median in audience size for that 
period. In column 6, we include only data for which we have information on session length 
(subsample 1, as defined in online appendix A), and for which the trial lasted 2 days or more. 
In column 7, we include a dummy for the presence of news stories on crimes; and the number 
of news stories on crimes. Estimates in columns 1–7 include controls for age, gender, 
nationality (French or other), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, number of prior 
convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first instance), 
county, length of time between offense and trial, dummies for month, day of week and year. 
All standard errors are clustered at the county level. News stories are those covered on the 
8PM national television news on TF1 and France 2. Source: authors’ calculations based on 
criminal records, provided by the French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the 
National Audiovisual Institute and from French criminal records, from publicly available 
police statistics. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix G: Additional Information on Corrections Courts and Juveniles 
 
In section 6, we present the effect of media on two kinds of courts that include only 
professional judges: corrections courts, and juvenile courts. We provide more details 
for each in turn. The statistics that we present are based on our calculations, using the 
same criminal records data as used for our main results (described in section 2.2).  
 
Corrections courts examine all criminal offenses that are not examined in criminal 
court – so offenses that entail a maximum prison sentence under 10 years. We present 
descriptive statistics in table G1. The most frequent offenses are driving offenses 
(41%, close to two thirds of which are for “driving under influence,” with the 
remainder for driving without a license or without insurance), followed by property 
crimes (17.6%), battery (9.5%) and drug-related offenses (7.9%). Between 2004 and 
2010, there were 485,000 (in 2004) to 637,000 (in 2010) cases tried each year.  
 
As in criminal court, there is no plea bargaining possible in corrections courts. There 
are no lay jurors in corrections courts; a panel of three professional judges decides on 
both conviction and sentences. Investigation length is generally shorter than in 
criminal court (one year on average). Cases can be judged within a week of the 
offense (comparution immediate, 5% of cases). A decision is not necessarily made at 
the end of the trial: decisions are delayed for 22% of cases. We restrict our sample to 
decisions that are not delayed, because for these cases we know the precise verdict 
date. 
 
Overall, sentences are much shorter in corrections court than in criminal court. In 
order to make cases more comparable, in tables 7 and 8, we focus on violent crime 
that could lead to at least 7 years in prison. These represent the most severe cases: 
virtually all such cases are for violence or sexual offenses (see column 4 of table G1).  
 
Juvenile courts examine two kinds of cases that involve youth: when a child is in 
danger (for example, extreme cases of child abuse);38 or when the offender was less 
than 18 years old at the time of crime for misdemeanors; 16 for felonies. The age 
threshold is determined by age at the time of the offense, not at the time of the trial. In 
juvenile court, three professionals make conviction and sentencing decisions: one 
juvenile judge, and two volunteers (assesseur du tribunal pour enfant), appointed for 
four years (renewable). Sentences can include incarceration, suspended sentences, or 
educational sanctions.  
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 7. There are about 300 cases per year, 
amounting to 2,508 between 2004 and 2010, or 2,212 when we exclude defendants 
below the age of 13, whose sentences cannot include prison time. Sentences in 
juvenile court cannot be more than half of the adult maximum. Sentences are 
generally handed down on the day of the verdict. In 57 cases, the decisions were 
postponed. We exclude these cases from the analysis, since we cannot precisely date 
when the sentence was handed down. 
 
Juvenile criminal courts examine felony cases when the offender was 16 or 17 years 
old, as well as that of co-offenders when at least one offender was less than 18. In 																																																								
38 This does not appear in criminal records, so is not part of these analyses.  
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section 6, we only consider offenders who are under the age of 21. Defendants 
younger than 21 represent 80% of people represented in juvenile criminal court. If an 
offender is over 21 years old, he or she cannot serve a sentence in juvenile prison.  
 
Here again, the relevant age threshold is age upon offending. As in criminal courts, 
conviction and sentencing are decided by a jury including lay people, but one of the 
presiding magistrates must be a juvenile judge. As opposed to adult trials, trials are 
behind closed doors, and juveniles cannot be named in the media. As in juvenile 
court, sentences cannot be more than half of the adult maximum, unless the court 
explicitly excludes the attenuating circumstance of being a minor. There are around 
250 cases per year, representing 2,024 cases between 2004 and 2010, and 1,842 when 
adults older than 21 are excluded. 
 
 
 
  Corrections courts (professional judges) 
  All No delay 
No delay, 
maximum prison 
term equal to or 
greater than 7 years 
No delay, maximum prison 
term equal to or greater 
than 7 years, violent or 
sexual crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male .9 .9 .92 .92 
French .78 .78 .83 .84 
Age (at crime) 32.6 32.8 27.4 35.48 
Investigation length (days) 346 357 569 1129 
Sentence (including suspended) 94 121 394 596 
Sentence in prison 44 53 225 290 
Crime types      
Violence .09 .11 .05 .41 
Sexual crimes .01 .02 .07 .59 
Property crimes .15 .16 .37 0 
Drug .08 .09 .37 0 
Road-related crimes .45 .36 0 0 
Maximum prison term      
≤ 1 year .26 .2 0 0 
2 years .31 .27 0 0 
3 years .18 .21 0 0 
4-5 years .16 .2 0 0 
≥ 7 years .1 .13 1 1 
N 3,409,698 2,212,694 287,104 35,358 
 
Table G1: Summary statistics on crimes judged in corrections courts.  
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Sample Felonies in juvenile court (without juror) 
Juveniles criminal court 
(with juror) age ≤ 21 
Juveniles criminal court 
(with juror) all ages 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Panel A: effect of news about perpetrated felonies  
on sentences (including suspended) 
Felony perp t-1 (dummy) 30.81 146.9** 191.8*** 
  (27.70) (69.40) (70.96) 
Felony perp t+1 (dummy) -16.15 -24.76 -0.755 
  (25.97) (94.41) (92.86) 
    
  Pval t-1/t+1 0.239 0.172 0.111 
Pval comparison t-1 with 
juvenile court   0.0521 0.00987 
Mean Sentence (including 
suspended) 
 800 2068 2169 
 
Panel B: effect of news about perpetrated felonies 
on sentence in prison 
Felony perp t-1 (dummy) -1.008 165.8* 219.3** 
  (17.68) (94.45) (93.82) 
Felony perp t+1 (dummy) 24.56 -22.12 6.530 
  (20.12) (125.4) (123.6) 
    
  Pval t-1/t+1 0.342 0.269 0.191 
Pval comparison t-1 with 
juvenile court   
0.0713 0.0139 
    
  Observations 2,269 1,842 2,022 
Mean sentence in prison 
178.2 1478 1610 
Table G2: Effects of media on decisions in juvenile courts and juvenile criminal 
courts: robustness checks. The outcome in all regressions is sentence length in days. 
In panel A, the outcome is sentence length (including suspended sentences). In panel 
B, the outcome is the imprisonment sentence. The first column includes all cases tried 
in juvenile court, including for youth less than 13 years old at the time of crime (and 
so ineligible for prison sentences). The second column shows the effect of media on 
sentencing only for juveniles less than 21 at the time of offense. The third column 
shows the effect of media on sentencing for all defendants tried in juvenile criminal 
court – including people older than 21 who committed offenses with juveniles. We 
include controls for day of week. News stories are those covered on the 8PM national 
television news on TF1 and France 2. Stories on perpetrated felonies are stories about 
crimes that do not mention trials or legislation. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Appendix H: Effect of Different Kinds of News between t-7 and t+7 
 
 
In the appendix, we present coefficients for a regression of sentence length on leads 
and lags of media content. Leads and lags are included simultaneously.  
 
 
 
  
(a) natural disasters (b) unemployment 
 
 
(c) social conflict (d) strikes 
 
 
 
Figure H1: Duration of the effect of media coverage of non-crime news stories on sentences: 
regression coefficients for perpetrated felonies, 7 days pre and post sentencing. Sub-figures 
(a) to (d) present the effect of coverage of natural disasters, unemployment, social conflict, 
and strikes (respectively). In each case, the measure is a dummy equal to one if there were 
any news stories on that topic on the 8PM national television news (TF1 and France 2). Note: 
the reported coefficients are for a single regression, which also includes controls for age, 
gender, nationality (dummy for being French), length of pre-trial detention, type of offense, 
number of prior convictions in the past five years, type of court (appellate court, court of first 
instance), county, length of time between offense and trial, and dummies for month, day of 
week and year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Bars represent the 95% 
confidence interval. Source: authors’ calculations based on criminal records, provided by the 
French Ministry of Justice, and data collected from the National Audiovisual Institute and 
from French criminal records.  
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